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WILLS AND TRUSTS
by
Michael V Bourland*
and Lynne McNiel Candler**
HIS Article reviews case law and legislative developments in the ar-
eas of wills, nontestamentary transfers, heirship, estate administra-
tion, guardianships, and trusts. The Survey period covers decisions
published between October 15, 1986, and October 15, 1987, as well as
changes to the Probate Code and the Trust Code enacted by the seventieth
Texas Legislature.
I. WILLS
Will Construction. The court in Diemer v. Diemer I examined a will to deter-
mine whether the term "issue" included adopted adults. The court con-
strued B.P. Diemer's will as well as the will and codicil of his wife, Dora
Diemer. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment that, under the facts
of this case, "issue" does not include adopted adults.2
B.P. Diemer executed his will on February 7, 1956. He died in 1959.
Diemer left life estates in his real property to his children, with the remain-
der passing to his children's descendants. One of his children, Ted, had no
children at the time B.P. Diemer executed his will. Diemer provided in his
will that Ted would receive a life estate in certain real property, with the
remainder passing to Ted's descendants. Diemer also provided, however,
that if Ted died without issue, the property would pass to the issue of each of
Diemer's other children. Diemer made no mention of issue in reference to
the distribution of remainder interests to the descendants of the other
children.
The court determined that, because he substituted the word "issue" for
"descendants" in reference to Ted's share, B.P. Diemer intended to include
only Ted's blood relatives in the class of remainder beneficiaries.3 The court
noted that the ordinary meaning of the word "issue" connotes consanguinity
and that it is a word of limitation.4 The court then held that B.P. Diemer
* B.A., J.D., Baylor University; LL.M. in Taxation, University of Miami of Florida.
Attorney at Law, Bourland, Smith, Wall & Wenzel, Fort Worth, Texas.
*0 B.A., University of Texas at Arlington; M.L.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University.
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1. 717 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
2. Id. at 161.
3. Id. at 162.
4. Id.
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used the word "issue" to exclude adopted children from the class of remain-
der beneficiaries.5
Dora Diemer's will was identical to that of her husband. Following his
death, however, Dora executed a codicil to her will. The codicil provided
that the remainder interest following Ted's life estate would pass to Ted's
children, per stirpes. Dora's codicil also specifically stated that the term
"child" or "children" included legally adopted children. Dora Diemer died
in 1963. In 1964 Ted married for the second time, and in 1968 Ted legally
adopted his second wife's adult son. The court held that Dora intended to
include legally adopted adults in her definition of legally adopted children
because she did not specify that she wished only to include legally adopted
minor children. 6
Another court examined whether a testatrix intended to create a life estate
in funds she had on deposit at certain financial institutions. 7 In her will
Mary Elizabeth Srubar left a life estate in her Galveston residence to her
friend, Christian Joswiak. Srubar left the remainder interest in her residence
and her residuary estate to her niece. Srubar later executed a codicil in
which she made a bequest of all funds that she had on deposit in two finan-
cial institutions to Joswiak. Srubar directed Joswiak to use these funds to
maintain the residence, including the payment of taxes and insurance. Jos-
wiak contended that he received a fee simple conditional estate in the funds.
The niece contended that Srubar did not intend to include certificates of
deposit in the term "funds on deposit." The trial court found that Srubar
intended the funds to be used to create a trust for the benefit of Joswiak as
life tenant of the property. The trial court also concluded that "funds on
deposit" included certificates of deposit and that the certificates of deposit at
these two financial institutions constituted part of the trust corpus.
The appeals court held that the trial court did not err in determining that
Srubar intended Joswiak to have access to the funds for maintaining and
preserving the residence, as he was obligated to do as life tenant.8 The court
noted that the law does not favor life estates in personal property, but that
courts will enforce a testator's intent to create a life estate in personal prop-
erty if that intent is clearly ascertainable. 9 The court upheld the trial court's
decision to place the funds in the hands of a trustee because a court has
discretion to place a life estate in personalty in trust in order to preserve the
value of the remainder interest. 10 The court also held that the term "funds
5. Id.
6. Id. at 163. The court stated that further proof of Dora's intent could be found
through her use of "children" to describe her own children, who were all adults at the time she
executed her will. Id.
7. In re Estate of Srubar, 728 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no
writ).
8. Id. at 439.
9. Id.; see also Bridges v. First Nat'l Bank, 430 S.W.2d 376, 382 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (life estates in personalty are not prohibited and will be upheld when
the clear intent of the testator is to establish such life estate and the intent is ascertainable from
the language of the will).
10. Id.; see also Abbott v. Wagner, 108 Neb. 359, 188 N.W. 113, 121 (1922) (a court not
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on deposit" includes certificates of deposit, which are within the ordinary
meaning of the term."
Community Property. The Texas Supreme Court, in Estate of Hanau v.
Hanau,12 determined that the quasi-community property rule announced in
Cameron v. Cameron 13 does not apply to probate matters. 14 Robert and
Dorris Hanau resided in Illinois when they married in 1974. They moved to
Texas in 1979. After moving to Texas, Robert executed a will in which he
left his separate property to his children from a previous marriage and his
community property to Dorris. Robert and Dorris each had substantial sep-
arate property interests when they married and they maintained those inter-
ests in their own names following their marriage. Robert acquired
additional shares of stock with his separate property after the marriage but
while the couple still resided in Illinois. Under Illinois law this property was
Robert's separate property. 15 Robert died in 1982. Dorris, the executor
under Robert's will, claimed that all stocks Robert acquired during the mar-
riage, whether the couple was residing in Illinois or in Texas when he ac-
quired the stocks, were community property. Robert's children stipulated
that any stocks bought while the couple resided in Texas were community
property, but they insisted that stocks Robert acquired while the couple re-
mained in Illinois were separate property. The trial court determined that
all of the stocks acquired during the marriage, whether acquired in Texas or
in Illinois, were community property. 16 The Corpus Christi court of appeals
affirmed in part and reversed in part.' 7
only has the power but is under a solemn duty of requiring adequate security or appointing a
trustee).
11. Id.
12. 730 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. 1987).
13. 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1982). Cameron v. Cameron involved the division in a divorce
proceeding of marital property acquired prior to the couple's move to Texas.
14. 730 S.W.2d at 666. See Allard v. Frech, 735 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1987, writ granted), in which the court examined whether the "terminable interest rule" ap-
plies to terminate a nonemployee spouse's interests in the other spouse's retirement benefits at
the death of the first spouse to die. Id at 313-15. The court declined to apply the "terminable
interest rule," and specifically left the decision to add the rule to Texas law to either the legisla-
ture or the Texas Supreme Court. Id. at 315. The court also examined the rule announced in
Valdez v. Ramierez, 574 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. 1978), that an employee spouse's benefits were her
separate property after the death of her husband, to determine the applicability of the Valdez
rule to this case. Allard, 735 S.W.2d at 313-15. The court distinguished Valdez because the
employee in Valdez was a federal employee whose benefits were determined under federal law.
Allard, 735 S.W.2d at 314-15. The court reasoned that the Texas Supreme Court specifically
failed to apply the Valdez rule to Texas law and implied that a retirement plan under state law
would possibly be considered community property. Allard, 735 S.W.2d at 314-15 (citing
Valdez, 574 S.W.2d at 753). For a discussion of other issues in Allard v. Frech, see infra notes
113-17 and accompanying text.
15. Estate of Hanau, 730 S.W.2d at 664 (additional shares purchased with separate prop-
erty during marriage remain separate property under Illinois common law).
16. The trial judge stated, "the Texas Supreme Court in Cameron v. Cameron could not
have intended to limit its new characterization of common law marital property to divorce
proceedings, but rather intended that said characterization to be [sic] applied to any situation
where the issue arose, including probate proceedings." Estate of Hanau, 730 S.W.2d at 665.
17. 721 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986). The court held that the
property acquired while the couple resided in Illinois was Robert's separate property and that
1988]
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The supreme court noted the rule that property retains the characteriza-
tion that it had when it was acquired; thus, property acquired in a common
law jurisdiction would retain its separate character after the owner moved to
Texas.18 The court examined the three bases for the holding in Cameron 19
and concluded that these bases were not applicable in the probate context. 20
First, other community property jurisdictions that have applied quasi-com-
munity property principles to probate proceedings have done so under statu-
tory authority. 21 Second, the Texas Legislature specifically provided for the
consideration of quasi-community property in a property distribution during
a divorce, but the legislature has not mandated such a consideration within a
probate situation.22 Third, a trial court should have the discretion to make
an equitable distribution of marital property in a divorce situation, but a
beneficiary has no comparable right to an equitable distribution of a dece-
dent's estate. 23 The court therefore concluded that the adoption of the Cam-
eron rule in the probate context would "make a shambles of 150 years of
Texas probate law. ' '24
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals' holding that the Trans-
World stock that Robert Hanau purchased after moving to Texas was com-
munity property.25 The parties stipulated that Robert owned 200 shares of
Texaco stock at the time he and Dorris married. After the marriage but
before the couple moved to Texas, Robert sold the Texaco stock and bought
200 shares of City Investing stock for approximately the amount of the pro-
ceeds of the Texaco stock and on the same day that he sold the Texaco
stock. After the couple moved to Texas, Robert sold the City Investing
stock and on the same day bought 200 shares of TransWorld stock for ap-
proximately the amount of the City Investing stock sale proceeds. The court
the separate property passed to Robert's children. Id. The court noted that the reclassification
of the separate property acquired while the couple resided in Illinois into community property
would not only go against Texas law but would also defeat the testator's intent to give this
property to his children. Id The court upheld the trial court's characterization of Trans-
World stock that Robert acquired while living in Texas as community property. Id.
18. Estate of Hanau, 730 S.W.2d at 665.
19. Id. at 665-66. The Cameron court first compared the laws of other community prop-
erty states. 641 S.W.2d at 220-21. The court then examined TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63
(Vernon Supp. 1988). 641 S.W.2d at 221-22. Finally, the court examined the trial court's
equitable powers in determining a distribution of marital property. Id. at 222-23.
20. Estate of Hanau, 730 S.W.2d at 666.
21. Id. at 665-66; see CAL. PROB. CODE § 66 (West Supp. 1987) (defining quasi-commu-
nity property for use in Probate Code); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-201 (1979) (providing disposition
of and defining quasi-community property).
22. See Estate of Hanau, 730 S.W.2d at 666. The Cameron court analyzed the adoption of
section 3.63 of the Texas Family Code. 641 S.W.2d at 221-22. Section 3.63 provides that a
trial judge may make a "just and right" division of the marital property, including property
that would have been community property if acquired while the spouses were domiciled in
Texas, but that was instead acquired while the spouses were domiciled in a common law state.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
23. 730 S.W.2d at 666. The court noted that a valid will should be enforced despite the
equity of the property distribution planned by the testator. Id. Further, a statutory formula
dictates the distribution of an intestate's property, so a probate court has no need to make
equitable decisions. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id at 667.
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of appeals held that the stipulations did not provide enough evidence to
overcome the community presumption.2 6 The supreme court, however,
noted that the couple maintained separate accounts for their separate prop-
erty and that they did not commingle funds.2 7 The supreme court held that
the court of appeals erred in holding that the TransWorld stock was commu-
nity property because it was not adequately traced from separate funds and
the supreme court consequently reversed and rendered judgment that the
stock should be transferred to Robert's son.28 Justice Spears concurred in
the court's opinion, but urged the legislature to adopt a Probate Code sec-
tion similar to Texas Family Code section 3.63 in order to provide for a
quasi-community property characterization in probate proceedings as well
as divorce proceedings so that equitable results might be achieved for surviv-
ing spouses. 29
Joint Wills. The Texas Supreme Court in Henderson v. Parker30 held that
the phrase "surviving children of this marriage," 31 used in William and Lil-
lie Parker's joint will, meant children who were alive when the couple exe-
cuted the will rather than children who survived the couple. 32 The Parkers
had three sons alive when they executed their joint will in 1971. The will
contained three alternative dispositive schemes. The first two schemes con-
tained mirror provisions devising the entire estate to the surviving spouse,
depending upon which spouse died first. The third scheme provided for dis-
position of the estate if both spouses died within sixty days of each other.
Basically, this disposition divided the couple's real property equally among
their three sons, who were named in the will. The couple died within four
days of each other. They were survived by two of their three sons and by
their predeceased son's two daughters.
The trial court determined that the two daughters of the predeceased son
took their father's share under the anti-lapse statute.3 3 The court of appeals
reversed and rendered judgment, in which it divided the real property
equally among the two surviving sons.34 The supreme court noted that the
survivorship language was a general statement followed by specific devises to
26, 721 S.W.2d at 518. The court of appeals, quoting Latham v. Allison, 560 S.W.2d 481,
485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.), stated that "[w]hen tracing separate
property, it is not enough to show that separate funds could have been the source of the subse-
quent deposit of funds." 721 S.W.2d at 518. The court felt that Robert's children failed to
meet the burden of overcoming the community presumption because they only conjectured
that all stock purchases in this chain of transactions were made from separate property. Id.
27. 730 S.W.2d at 667.
28. Id.
29. Id. (Spears, J., concurring).
30. 728 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1987).
31. Id. at 769, 770.
32. Id. at 770.
33. Parker v. Henderson, 712 S.W.2d 224, 225 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986),
rev'd, 728 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. 1987); see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 68 (Vernon 1980).
34. Parker v. Henderson, 712 S.W.2d 224, 227-28 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1986). The appeals court determined that the language used in the will created a class gift to
the children who survived the testators; since only two of the sons survived the testators, they
received equal shares in the entire estate. Id. at 227.
1988]
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each of the three sons, and stated that specific provisions carry greater
weight than general provisions. 35 The supreme court determined that the
survivorship language meant children who were surviving at the time the
couple executed the will because testamentary intent is determined as of the
time the testator executes the will. 36 The court found support in the specific
bequests, which contained no survivorship language. 37 The supreme court
thus reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial
court.
3 8
In Jones v. Jones3 9 the court affirmed the trial court's judgment that a
joint will was contractual and mutual as a matter of law.4° Homer and Edna
Jones executed a joint will in 1967 in which the first to die left his or her
estate entirely to the survivor and the survivor then left his or her estate to
their three children in equal shares. In 1975 Homer Jones died. Edna Jones
made a new will in 1977 in which she favored one of the couple's three
children more than the other two. In 1982 Edna Jones died. The daughter
favored under the 1977 will offered it for probate. The other two children
contested the admission of the 1977 will to probate and applied for probate
of the 1967 joint will. The trial court admitted the 1977 will to probate, but
imposed a constructive trust on the estate in favor of the two children who
contested the admission of the 1977 will to probate. The trial court reasoned
that the 1967 will was, as a matter of law, contractual and mutual. The
daughter favored under the 1977 will appealed the trial court's judgment.
The appeals court first noted that the fact that the couple made a joint will
does not prove that the couple made the will under a contract. 4 1 Next, the
court cited the analysis of the court in Fisher v. Capp,42 in which the Fisher
court studied Texas Supreme Court cases holding that joint wills were con-
tractual. The court then summarized the themes found by the Fisher court
in determining which joint wills are contractual.43 The common themes in
the cases, according to the court, are that the survivor receives a conditional
gift upon the death of the first to die and that the entire estate is "treated as a
single estate and jointly disposed of by both testators in the secondary dis-
positive provisions of the will" upon the death of the second to die.44 The
court held that Homer and Edna Jones intended to grant the survivor of
them a conditional estate and to unite the estates upon the death of the sec-
ond to die to effectuate a common dispositive scheme, thus creating a bind-
ing contract. 45
35. 728 S.W.2d at 770.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 771.
39. 718 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
40. Id. at 418.
41. Id.
42. 597 S.W.2d 393, 398-99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
43. 718 S.W.2d at 418.
44. Id.
45. Id. In Jones v. Chamberlain, 733 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987, no writ),
the court similarly affirmed a trial court's finding that an earlier joint will was contractual so
that, although one party's subsequent will was admitted to probate, the assets were subject to
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The court in Alviar v. Gonzalez46 construed a joint will, which Enrique
and Librada Alviar had executed in 1980. They both died in 1981, with
Enrique Alviar predeceasing his wife by five months. Enrique owned some
real property prior to their marriage that comprised the bulk of their estate.
The will provided that the survivor should take all of their property at the
death of the first to die, "to be used, occupied, enjoyed, conveyed, and ex-
pended by and during the lifetime of such survivor, as such survivor shall
desire. ' '47 No provision was made for distribution of the estate after the
death of the second to die. Enrique and Librada Alviar each had children
from previous marriages, but no children together. Enrique Alviar's heirs
sought to have the court construe the will as creating a life estate in the
surviving spouse, so that they would take title to the property. Librada Al-
viar's heirs contended that Enrique Alviar conveyed a fee simple interest to
his wife upon his death, so that they would take title to the property as her
heirs. The trial court found that the will gave the real property to Librada
Alviar in fee simple. Enrique Alviar's heirs appealed.
The court of appeals held that the will conveyed a life estate coupled with
the right to consume or transfer the property.4 8 The additional right to con-
sume or transfer property did not serve to convert a life estate into a fee
simple interest.49 The court also held that since the couple made no provi-
sion for disposition of the estate upon the death of the second to die, the
estate would pass by intestacy to the heirs of both Enrique and Librada Al-
viar.50 One justice dissented to the court's holding, stating that the will was
unclear as to whether it conveyed a life estate or a fee simple estate to the
survivor.5 1 Because of the ambiguity in the will's language the dissent ap-
plied legal presumptions to reach a decision different from the majority. The
dissent first applied the rule that the law favors gifts of the largest estate
possible under a will unless the testator clearly states a contrary intent.5 2
The dissent next applied the presumption against partial intestacy; the ma-
jority's holding resulted in the passage of the remainder interest under intes-
tacy, which is contrary to this presumption.
5 3
Self-Proving Affidavits. In Cutler v. Ament5 4 the court held that the invalid-
ity of a self-proving affidavit did not invalidate the will. 5" Constance Cutler
executed a will in January 1979 and a second will in March 1982. The self-
the constructive trust imposed by the joint will. Id. at 277. The crux of this appeal concerned
the appellant's failure to prove the affirmative defense of laches. Id. at 277-78.
46. 725 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
47. Id. at 298 (emphasis by the court).
48. 725 S.W.2d at 299.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 300.
51. Id. (Dorsey, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
53. Id.; see also Zint v. Crofton, 563 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (there is a positive presumption against intestacy and when a will is ambigu-
ous it will be given a construction that will prevent intestacy).
54. 726 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
55. Id. at 607.
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proving affidavit attached to the second will was defective because it stated
that the witnesses to the will "subscribed and acknowledged" 56 that they
witnessed the execution of the will. The Probate Code provides for self-
proving wills if each witness states on oath that he or she signed the will at
the testator's request in the testator's presence. 7 Instead, this affidavit pro-
vided that the testator swore to the will and that the witnesses acknowledged
the will. The court held that the effect of the defective self-proving affidavit
was the same as if no affidavit had been attached and remanded the case to
the trial court for a determination of the validity of the second will.58 The
court reasoned that the self-proving affidavit is not part of the will but is
instead a separate and distinct document that serves only an evidentiary
function.5 9
Noncupative Wills. The court in Kay v. Sandier 60 determined that an alleged
noncupative will did not meet the Probate Code requirements6' for a
noncupative will.62 Jack Kay, while in the hospital suffering from coronary
artery disease, discussed a new will with his attorney. No one else was pres-
ent during this discussion, and Kay did not declare his intent to make an
oral will to his attorney. The attorney prepared a draft of a new will within
the next few days. Kay left the hospital and returned to work. On the day
that the attorney arrived to deliver the new will to Kay, the attorney learned
56. Id. at 606.
57. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980). Section 59 provides an example of a
self-proving affidavit. The jurat found at the end of the example clearly states "subscribed and
sworn to before me by the said ... witnesses." Id.
58. 726 S.W.2d at 606.
59. Id. at 607. The leading case in interpreting self-proving affidavits is Boren v. Boren,
402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1966). The testator in Boren signed his one-page will and the attached
self-proving affidavit, but the witnesses signed only the self-proving affidavit. The court, in a
literal interpretation of § 59, held that the will was inadmissible to probate because it was not
witnessed. Id. at 729-30. The court stated that the self-proving affidavit only serves to allow
the admission of a will to probate without a subscribing witness's testimony. Id. at 729. Texas
courts have continued to interpret strictly self-proving affidavits as evidentiary documents
only. See, e.g., Orrell v. Cochran, 695 S.W.2d 552, 552 (Tex. 1985) (self-proviig provisions of
a will are not part of the will but concern only the matter of proof); Wich v. Fleming, 652
S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. 1983) (will and self-proving affidavits are separate and distinct docu-
ments; the self-proving provisions only concern proof); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 708 S.W.2d 31,
33 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (purpose of the self-proving affidavit is to elimi-
nate the need for testimony of the subscribing witness when the will is offered for probate).
60. 718 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
61. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 65 (Vernon 1980) provides the requisites for a valid
noncupative will:
No noncupative will shall be established unless it be made in the time of the last
sickness of the deceased, at his home or where he has resided for ten days or
more next preceding the date of such will, except when the deceased is taken
sick away from home and dies before he returns home; nor when the value ex-
ceeds Thirty Dollars, unless it be proved by three credible witnesses that the
testator called on a person to take notice or bear testimony that such is his will,
or words of like import.
Id. The Probate Code also specifies the manner of proof of a noncupative will. TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 86 (Vernon 1980). If the estate value is greater than thirty dollars, the propo-
nent of the noncupative will must bring forward three credible witnesses who will testify that
the testator called on them to take notice of his will. Id. § 86(c).
62. 718 S.W.2d at 875.
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that Kay had suffered a heart attack and was unconscious. Kay never
regained consciousness. Kay's estate was well in excess of thirty dollars.
The appellee offered Kay's 1983 written will to probate, but the appellant
claimed that the alleged noncupative will revoked the written will. The trial
court entered summary judgment admitting the 1983 written will to probate.
The court noted that the noncupative will that the appellant wished to
have probated was actually the draft prepared by the attorney. 63 The court
found that the record indicated that only the attorney could offer testimony
about what Kay said regarding the disposition of his estate. 64 The other two
affiants could only testify that Kay told them, after he had spoken with his
attorney, that he was making a new will. The court held that three credible
witnesses could not give testimony supporting as Kay's noncupative will the
dispositive scheme set out in the will draft, so, as a matter of law, the will
offered by the appellant failed to meet a requirement of Probate Code section
65 and it could not be probated as a valid will. 65
Developments in Tort Law. Cases sometimes arise in the tort context that
contain valuable lessons for the estate practitioner. During the Survey pe-
riod two such cases arose.66
The appeals court in Berry v. Dodson, Nunley & Taylor, P.C. 67 held that in
the absence of privity of contract an attorney owes no duty to third parties,
including potential beneficiaries of a new will.68 Henry Berry hired the at-
torney to prepare a new will for him while he was hospitalized with terminal
cancer. Berry had executed a will in 1977 in which he left his estate to his
second wife and the children of his first marriage. Berry decided to change
the distribution of his estate, to change the trustees of the trust he wished to
establish for the benefit of his children, and to provide for his wife's children
from a previous marriage in the same manner as and equally with his own
children. Berry died about two months after he first consulted with the at-
torney. The attorney had prepared a draft of the new will, but it was not
executed prior to Berry's death. Berry's 1977 will was admitted into probate
and his estate was distributed under its terms. Mrs. Berry and her children
sued the attorney and his firm. The law firm moved for summary judgment
based on lack of privity, and the trial court granted summary judgment.
Mrs. Berry and her children appealed, claiming that privity existed and that
the law firm owed them a duty.
The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment.69 The court stated
that only the decedent and the attorney were involved in an attorney-client
63. Id. at 875.
64. Id.
65. Id. The court had earlier noted that a noncupative will must meet all requirements of
§ 65 in order to be admitted to probate. Id. at 874.
66. Berry v. Dodson, Nunley & Taylor, P.C., 717 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1986), remanded for entry ofjudgment pursuant to settlement agreement, 729 S.W.2d 690 (Tex.
1987); King v. Acker, 725 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
67. 717 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986).
68. Id. at 719.
69. Id.
1988]
358 SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
relationship despite Mrs. Berry's testimony that the attorney gave her legal
advice and that she initiated the contacts between her husband and the attor-
ney.70 The court next examined whether the attorney owed Mrs. Berry a
duty in the absence of privity. 7' The court noted that Texas follows the
majority view that persons not privy to the attorney-client relationship do
not have a cause of action for any injuries they might suffer as a result of the
attorney's breach of a duty to the client. 72 The court noted the trend in a
minority of jurisdictions away from the majority rule, especially when the
persons claiming a cause of action are intended beneficiaries under a will
that the attorney negligently prepared or that was improperly executed. 73
The court declined to hold contrary to Texas law and consequently deter-
mined that the attorney owed no duty to the intended beneficiaries when no
privity of contract existed. 74
The Texas Supreme Court granted writ in the case, but prior to deciding
the case the court granted the joint motion of the parties to set aside the
judgments of the trial court and the court of appeals and to remand the case
to the trial court for entry of judgment under the terms of a settlement agree-
ment between the parties. 75 The result of the supreme court's action is un-
clear. Because the court was willing to grant writ in the case, the court may
be willing in the near future to overturn the majority rule in this state. Es-
tate planning practitioners should consequently be aware that they may be
held accountable to the intended beneficiaries under a will.
In King v. Acker 76 the court of appeals considered tortious interference
with inheritance. Fred King was admitted to the hospital in January 1982
suffering from an aneurysm. He was alert on January 4, 1982, when a doc-
tor examined him. The next day he underwent surgery on the aneurysm.
70. Id. at 718.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The court noted that California courts have made the most significant inroads to
the majority view. Id. See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 167, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 231 (1969) (attorney owes separate and distinct duty of care to intended benefi-
ciaries); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 823 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962) (lack of privity between attorney and beneficiaries does not
preclude cause of action if harm to beneficiaries was foreseeable); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d
647, 320 P.2d 16, 18 (1958) (notary who prepared will was liable for invalid attestation). The
court also listed decisions in other states that protected intended beneficiaries of wills. Berry,
717 S.W.2d at 719 (citing Stowe v. Smith, 184 Conn. 194, 441 A.2d 81, 83 (1981) (beneficiary
had a cause of action in contract as a third-party beneficiary); Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d
1060, 1062 (D.C. 1983) (intended beneficiary could bring malpractice action despite lack of
privity); McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167, 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (testator's child
could bring malpractice action for attorney's negligence in advising testator); Ogle v. Fuiten,
102 Ill. 2d 356, 466 N.E.2d 224, 227 (1984) (beneficiaries could bring breach of contract action
as third-party beneficiaries); Tuttle v. Schlater (Succession of Killingsworth), 292 So. 2d 536,
542 (La. 1973) (legatees were third-party beneficiaries); Jaramillo v. Hood, 93 N.M. 433, 601
P.2d 66, 67 (1979) (beneficiary could bring malpractice action); Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47,
459 A.2d 744, 751 (1983) (third-party beneficiary can recover based upon RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1979)); Auric v. Continental Casualty Co., 111 Wis. 2d 507,
331 N.W.2d 325, 329 (1983) (lack of privity does not bar negligence action against attorney)).
74. 717 S.W.2d at 719.
75. 729 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1987).
76. 725 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1987, no writ).
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Approximately a week after surgery King lapsed into a coma from which he
never regained consciousness. He died about a month after he was first ad-
mitted to the hospital. While King was in the coma, his second wife, Lor-
raine, attempted to assign shares of stock in Petro-Chem Technical Services
from King to herself under a power of attorney that King supposedly exe-
cuted in her favor on January 4, 1982. After King's death, Lorraine and her
attorney filed a will for probate that King supposedly also executed on Janu-
ary 4, 1982. King had executed a will in 1977, which was admitted to pro-
bate after the probate court heard evidence on the validity of the purported
1982 will. The probate court appointed a temporary administrator while
awaiting the determination of which will should be admitted to probate.
The temporary administrator recovered the Petro-Chem stock from Lor-
raine and sold it during the period of temporary administration. The stock
sale resulted in a $20,000. commission for the temporary administrator.
King's two children from his first marriage incurred over $76,000 in legal
fees and $8,275 in fees for a document examiner who examined the 1982 will
in fighting against the admission of the 1982 will to probate. The two chil-
dren were named co-independent administrators when King's 1977 will was
admitted to probate.
The children and King's mother, who also was a beneficiary under the
1977 will, brought this action against Lorraine, her attorney, and others,
who purportedly witnessed the 1982 will. The court severed the cause of
action against Lorraine from that against the other defendants. The jury
found that King did not execute the power of attorney on January 4, 1982,
and that he did not sign the will dated January 4, 1982. The jury addition-
ally found that Lorraine maliciously interfered with the plaintiffs' inheri-
tance, that she conspired to interfere tortiously with their inheritance, and
that the plaintiffs suffered actual damages of $28,275 and exemplary dam-
ages of $76,096.82, which equalled the amount of their legal fees. The trial
court entered judgment against Lorraine in the amount of $104,371.82, plus
interest. Lorraine appealed.
The court of appeals held that the jury finding that King did not execute
the power of attorney provided sufficient evidence that Lorraine tortiously
interfered with the testamentary scheme under King's 1977 will.7 7 The
court additionally held that sufficient evidence existed to support the jury
finding that Lorraine acted with malice in transferring the stock to herself
since the jury found that King did not execute the power of attorney. 7 The
court held that a cause of action for tortious interference with inheritance
exists in Texas. 79 The court noted that the estate would not have incurred
the expense of the $20,000 commission to the temporary administrator for
the sale of the stock but for Lorraine's actions, so the court held that the jury
properly considered the commission in determining the plaintiffs' actual
77. Id. at 753.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 754. The court cited Tippett v. Hart, 497 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Pope v. Garrett, 204 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Galveston 1947), rev'd on other grounds, 211 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1948), for this holding.
1988]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
damages.80 The court also upheld the award of exemplary damages because
the jury found that Lorraine acted with malice."' The court reduced the
actual damages to $20,000, but affirmed the judgment of the trial court in
everything else.8 2
II. NONTESTAMENTARY TRANSFERS
Life Insurance. In Crawford v. Coleman 83 the Texas Supreme Court over-
ruled its previous interpretation8 4 of Insurance Code article 21.23.85 Corne-
lius Shoaf stabbed and killed his wife, Sandra, in 1979. Sandra had four
insurance policies on her life. All four of the policies named Cornelius as the
primary beneficiary. Cornelius obtained two of the policies through his job;
his son from a previous marriage, Cornell, was the contingent beneficiary
under these two policies. Cornelius could not receive benefits under the poli-
cies since he willfully killed Sandra. The trial court awarded the proceeds of
two of the policies to Sandra's parents, the Crawfords, who were the contin-
gent beneficiaries under the latter two policies. The trial court awarded the
benefits under the two policies Cornelius obtained through his employment
to his son, who was the contingent beneficiary under those policies. The
court of appeals affirmed.8 6
The Crawfords contended that they should receive the policy benefits
awarded to Cornell Shoaf because they were Sandra's nearest relatives. The
court held in Deveroex v. Nelson that insurance proceeds are paid to the
nearest relative under Insurance Code article "21.23 only if all of the benefi-
ciaries, primary and contingent, are disqualified from receiving such pro-
ceeds."' 87 The court based this holding on the belief that distributing life
insurance benefits to beneficiaries who were not statutorily disqualified from
receiving the benefits would accomplish both the insured's intent and the
legislature's goal of denying benefits to the person or persons who willfully
brought about the insured's death. 88 The Crawford court discarded this rea-
soning because the holding clearly contradicted the language of the statute.8 9
The statute clearly provides that the benefits are to be paid to the decedent's
80. 725 S.W.2d at 755. The court held, however, that the jury should not have included
the costs associated with handwriting experts since these costs are litigation expenses, which
cannot be recovered. Id.
81. Id. The court noted that although attorney's fees usually are not considered in com-
puting actual damages, they may be considered in computing exemplary damages. The court
held that the trial court's instruction to the jury that they may consider attorney's fees in
computing exemplary damages was proper. Id. at 757.
82. Id.
83. 726 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. 1987).
84. See Deveroex v. Nelson, 529 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Tex. 1975).
85. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.23 (Vernon 1981). Article 21.23 provides:
The interest of a beneficiary in a life insurance policy or contract heretofore or
hereafter issued shall be forfeited when the beneficiary is the principal or an
accomplice in willfully bringing about the death of the insured. When such is
the case .... the nearest relative of the insured shall receive said insurance.
86. Crawford v. Coleman, 701 S.W.2d 79, 85 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985).
87. 529 S.W.2d at 513.
88. Id.; see 726 S.W.2d at 10.
89. 726 S.W.2d at 10-11.
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nearest relative. 90 The court held that, under the statute, when any benefici-
ary willfully causes the insured's death, the benefits of the policy are to be
paid to the insured's nearest relative, and the court therefore reversed the
court of appeals and rendered judgment that the Crawfords take the policy
proceeds as Sandra's nearest relatives. 91 Justice Kilgarlin, joined by Justice
Campbell, concurred in part and dissented in part. 9 2
Joint Tenancy Accounts. Five decisions interpreted joint tenancy language
during the Survey period. 93 The court in Sawyer v. Lancaster94 held that
affidavit testimony that a joint account was established as a convenience for
the decedent, who was an invalid before his death, was admissible, but was
legally insufficient to rebut the presumption of survivorship rights under a
joint account.95 The bank signature card did not specifically provide that
the account was intended to be a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship.
The co-depositor clause stated that the funds were to be paid to either of the
co-depositors or to the survivor of them. The court held that this language,
while insufficient to meet the requirements of Probate Code section 439(a)
for creating a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship,96 created a presump-
tion of survivorship. 97 The court noted that every Texas decision since the
enactment of section 439(a) has held that extrinsic evidence of the deceased
joint tenant's intent is not admissible to alter the unambiguous survivorship
language of the signature card.98 The court held, however, that if only a
90. See supra note 84.
91. 726 S.W.2d at 11. The court specifically noted that its holding is not to be construed
as an implication that Cornell fell under the corruption-of-blood doctrine. Id.
92. Id. at 11-14 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kilgarlin
agreed that the Crawfords were entitled to the proceeds of one of the insurance policies in issue
because he felt that they were entitled to the proceeds under the policy's terms. Id. at 12.
Justice Kilgarlin opposed the overruling of the Deveroex holding, however, because he felt that
the insured's intentional designation of a contingent beneficiary would be defeated should the
primary beneficiary willfully cause the insured's death. Id. at 13.
93. Tuttle v. Simpson, 735 S.W.2d 539, 543-45 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987, no writ);
Allard v. Frech, 735 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, writ granted); Dickerson v. Brooks,
727 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); McCarty v. First
State Bank & Trust Co., 723 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 730 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1987); Sawyer v. Lancaster, 719 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ). For a survey of legislative changes to joint tenancy ac-
counts, see infra notes 273, 275-77 and accompanying text.
94. 719 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
95. Id. at 350.
96. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a) (Vernon 1980). Section 439(a) provides, in part:
Sums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belong to
the surviving party ... against the estate of the decedent if, by a written agree-
ment signed by the party who dies, the interest of such deceased party is made to
survive to the surviving party .... A survivorship agreement will not be in-
ferred from the mere fact that the account is a joint account.
97. 719 S.W.2d at 349.
98. Id. (citing Chopin v. InterFirst Bank of Dallas, N.A., 694 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Otto v. Klement, 656 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sheffield v. Estate of Dozier, 643 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)). The court noted that the cases, with the exception of Chopin, state the rule that
extrinsic evidence that an account was established as a joint account for mere convenience
cannot alter papers that establish the account as a joint tenancy with survivorship rights. 719
S.W.2d at 349. The court specifically disagreed with the holding in Chopin that language
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presumption of survivorship is raised, extrinsic evidence is admissible to de-
termine the true nature of the account. 99
The appeals court in McCarty v. First State Bank & Trust Co. '00 reached a
different conclusion than did the court in Sawyer v. Lancaster.10 ' In Mc-
Carty the court held that extrinsic evidence, in the form of an affidavit signed
by the deceased depositor and two witnesses a few days after the decedent
deposited funds in the bank, was inadmissible to determine the nature of the
account.' 0 2 The affidavit specifically stated that the decedent wished the
funds to be placed in a joint account with rights of survivorship. The bank
signature card did not provide for survivorship rights. The court held that
the affidavit, although signed by the decedent, was really the affidavit of the
two witnesses, and that the affidavit merely expressed the decedent's intent
in establishing the account.10 3 The appeals court reversed the trial court's
judgment.' ° 4 The supreme court reversed in part and remanded. 0 5 The
supreme court based the reversal on the fact that the court of appeals failed
to consider the bank's indemnity claim against the surviving joint tenant.
The bank had paid the survivor the money in the account based on the affi-
davit. The bank's third-party claim against the survivor became moot when
the trial court found that the account was a joint account with rights of
survivorship. The court of appeals failed to consider the bank's claim
against the survivor when it reversed the trial court's judgment. The
supreme court held that the court of appeals rendered judgment in violation
of rule 81 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 0 6
In Dickerson v. Brooks ' 07 the court held that the facts that two savings
certificates did not specify that they were held as joint accounts with survi-
vorship rights and that the decedent did not sign either certificate were irrel-
evant in determining that the accounts were held as joint tenancies with
directing that funds on deposit are to be payable to the survivor do not create a survivorship
account. Id. The court noted that language directing that the funds on deposit be paid to the
survivor instead creates a rebuttable presumption of survivorship rights, and that extrinsic
evidence is admissible to establish the nature of the account if the language signed by the
depositor is ambiguous. Id.
99. Id. at 349-50.
100. 723 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. App.-Texarkana), rev'd on other grounds, 730 S.W.2d 656
(Tex. 1987). For a discussion of the supreme court opinion, see infra notes 174-78 and accom-
panying text.
101. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
102. 723 S.W.2d at 794-95.
103. Id. at 795. The court stated that the Probate Code provides that the depositor's intent
should not be considered. Id. The court noted that the affidavit was inadmissible hearsay,
although no hearsay objection was made, and that the affidavit was not relevant and thus the
trial court erred in overruling a relevancy objection. Id. Finally, the court noted that the
affidavit did not meet the requirements of a written notice to a financial institution under TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 440 (Vernon 1980) because it was not the statement of the depositor and
because it was not addressed to the bank. 723 S.W.2d at 795.
104. 723 S.W.2d at 795.
105. First State Bank & Trust Co. v. McCarty, 730 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex. 1987).
106. Id. at 657. TEX. R. App. P. 81(c) provides that the court of appeals may render
judgment when it reverses the trial court "except when it is necessary to remand to the court
below for further proceedings."
107. 727 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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rights of survivorship. l0 8 The signature cards and applications for the two
accounts stated that the accounts were joint accounts with rights of survivor-
ship and that the joint tenants held not as tenants in common but as joint
tenants with rights of survivorship. All three tenants, including the dece-
dent, signed the signature cards. The court also examined a promissory
note, which provided that in the event the payee died the note was payable to
her named heirs. The court found that the promissory note met the provi-
sions of Texas Probate Code section 450109 and that the promissory note was
a nontestamentary transfer. 1 0 The dissent noted that in order not to be
considered testamentary in character a promissory note must fall within one
of three exceptions provided in section 450.111 The dissent stated that the
promissory note should state clearly and unambiguously who shall receive
the payments on the payee's death, and that this promissory note did not
provide this information clearly and unambiguously.'12
In Allard v. Frech 113 the court determined that funds in a bank account
designated as a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship were community
funds despite the designation."14 The couple deposited community funds
into the account. The surviving husband argued that the couple's designa-
tion of the account as a joint tenancy with survivorship rights indicated that
the couple intended to partition the property before establishing the account.
The court noted that the signature card contained no partition language."15
108. Id. at 654.
109. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 450 (Vernon 1980). Id. § 450(a) provides that provi-
sions in a promissory note, among other instruments, that state that money shall be paid after
the payee's death to specified persons are nontestamentary.
110. 727 S.W.2d at 654.
111. Id. at 654, 655 (Dunn, J., dissenting). TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 450(a) (Vernon
1980) provides that an instrument is deemed to be nontestamentary when:
(1) that money or other benefits theretofore due to, controlled, or owned by a
decedent shall be paid after his death to a person designated by the decedent in
either the instrument or a separate writing, including a will, executed at the
same time as the instrument or subsequently;
(2) that any money due or to become due under the instrument shall cease to
be payable in event of the death of the promisee or the promissor before pay-
ment or demand; or
(3) that any property which is the subject of the instrument shall pass to a
person designated by the decedent in either the instrument or a separate writing,
including a will, executed at the same time as the instrument or subsequently.
112. Id. The dissent also felt that the majority should not have classified one of the saving
accounts as a joint tenancy with ights of survivorship. Id.
113. 735 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ granted). For a discussion of the
community property issue in this case, see supra note 14.
114. 735 S.W.2d at 317; see also Tuttle v. Simpson, 735 S.W.2d 539, 544-45 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1987, no writ) (court held that, in absence of partitioning language on certificate of
deposit, community funds deposited as joint tenancy with rights of survivorship remained
community property). For a further discussion of Tuttle v. Simpson see infra notes 187-93 and
accompanying text.
115. Id. at 316. The Texas Constitution permits spouses to partition community property
into separate property. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15. The Family Code provides that a parti-
tion must be in writing signed by both spouses. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.44 (Vernon Supp.
1988). The Probate Code provides for joint tenancies with survivorship rights between
spouses. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46 (Vernon Supp. 1988). Section 46(b) specifically ad-
dresses joint tenancies with survivorship rights between spouses:
A written agreement between spouses and a bank ... may provide that existing
19881
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The court thus decided that the partition was fictional 1l6 and held that
couples must actively partition community funds prior to establishing a joint
tenancy with rights of survivorship.1 17
III. HEIRSHIP
Two cases examined the inheritance rights of illegitimate children during
the Survey period. 118 In Stafford v. Little 19 the court reversed the trial
court's judgment that the descendants of Lilly Holley Kelly, found by the
trial court to be the recognized natural daughter of Henry Holley, were not
heirs-at-law of Henry Holley because they did not prove that Lilly's mother
and Henry Holley were ever married. 120 Henry Holley died intestate in
1925. Henry owned approximately 100 acres of land in Smith County that
eventually passed to his grandson, Bob Holley. The descendants of Henry
and Susan Holley filed two affidavits of heirship in 1940. The affidavits as-
serted that Henry Holley was married only once, to Susan Holley. In 1980
Lilly Holley Kelly's descendants filed suit to determine their heirship rights.
Kelly's family alleged that Henry Holley had also married Easter Smith,
Kelly's mother, and that Kelly was Henry Holley and Easter Smith's natu-
ral, recognized daughter. 12 1 The trial court found that Kelly's descendants
funds or securities on deposit and funds and securities to be deposited in the
future and interest and income thereon shall by that agreement be partitioned
into separate property and may further provide that the property partitioned by
that agreement be held in joint tenancies and pass by right of survivorship.
Id. § 46(b). The court noted that the spouses must actually partition the property before they
can create a joint tenancy with survivorship rights. 735 S.W.2d at 316. Since the court de-
cided this case, the public voted in the November 3, 1987, general election to amend the Texas
Constitution to allow spouses to create joint tenancies with survivorship rights without first
partitioning community property. TEX. CONST. art XVI, § 15 (1948, amended 1980, amended
1987). See infra note 277 and accompanying text for further discussion of this constitutional
amendment and the resulting statutory change.
116. 735 S.W.2d at 316.
117. Id. at 317. The court went on to examine the character of certain items contained on
the Inventory, Appraisement, and List of Claims and to examine the merit of certain court
orders. Id. at 317-20.
118. Stafford v. Little, 730 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no writ); Seyffert v. Briggs,
727 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
119. 730 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no writ).
120. Id. at 163.
121. An illegitimate child could not inherit from his or her natural father's estate at the
time Holley died in 1925 unless the child's natural parents later married and the father recog-
nized the child as his own. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 2581 (Vernon 1925), repealed by Act of
Apr. 4, 1955, ch. 55, § 434, 1955 Tex. Gen. Laws 88, 214. The Act of Apr. 4, 1955, codified
art. 2581 into § 42 of the Texas Probate Code. TEX. PROB. CODE § 42, Act of Apr. 4, 1955,
ch. 55, § 42, 1955 Tex. Gen. Laws 88, 102, amended by Act of May 28, 1977, ch. 290, § 1,
1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 762, 762-63, amended by Act of Mar. 22, 1979, ch. 24, § 25, 1979 Tex.
Gen. Laws 35, 40, amended by Act of June 13, 1979, ch. 713, § 5, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1740,
1743, amended by Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 464, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4085, 4086
(Vernon). See infra note 282 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutory change
to this section of the Probate Code. Following 1977 the legislature made changes in § 42 of the
Probate Code in order to make the provisions of this section comply with the United States
Supreme Court decision in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). The Supreme Court held
in Trimble that a state cannot statutorily mandate that illegitimate children absolutely cannot
inherit from their natural fathers unless the natural parents later legitimate the child by mar-
rying. Id. at 776. Following Trimble the Texas Legislature amended section 42(b) to provide:
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did not prove that Henry Holley and Easter Smith were married. The court
of appeals held that the trial court based its judgment on an unconstitutional
statute and reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.122
The court in Seyffert v. Briggs 12 3 held that a child who failed to allege that
she had been legitimated by her father under the provisions of Texas Probate
Code section 42(b) did not have a justiciable interest in contesting the ap-
pointment of an administrator of an estate. 124 H.W. Briggs and his only
wife, who predeceased him, had no children. Briggs left a valid will, but the
executors he named in the will were unable to serve in that capacity.
Briggs's nephew offered the will to probate and applied to the court to be
named administrator with will annexed. Sandra Seyffert, who alleged that
she was the recognized natural daughter of H.W. Briggs, challenged the ap-
pointment of the nephew because as Briggs's daughter she should have pri-
ority to be appointed administrator. The trial court struck Seyffert's
pleadings because she failed to allege a justiciable interest, and she appealed.
The court of appeals examined Seyffert's pleadings to ascertain whether
she alleged a justiciable interest. 125 Seyffert alleged that she was Briggs's
daughter and that before January 1, 1974, Briggs had acknowledged that she
was his daughter in a written statement. Seyffert cited Texas Family Code
section 13.24126 to show the validity of Briggs's statement. Seyffert con-
tended that because Briggs made a written acknowledgment of paternity
prior to January 1, 1974, the writing satisfied section 42(b) of the Probate
Code. 127 The court concluded that the words "valid and binding" found in
section 13.24 of the Family Code mean valid and binding as evidence, which
can be rebutted, that the child is the writer's child. 128 The court added that
section 42(b) of the Probate Code uses statements executed pursuant to
chapter 13 of the Family Code to establish inheritance rights conclusively
For the purpose of inheritance, a child is the legitimate child of his father if the
child is born or conceived before or during the marriage of his father and
mother or is legitimated by a court decree as provided by Chapter 13 of the
Family Code, or if the father executed a statement of paternity as provided by
Section 13.22 of the Family Code, or a like statement properly executed in an-
other jurisdiction, so that he and his issue shall inherit from his father and from
his paternal kindred, both descendants, ascendants, and collaterals in all de-
grees, and they may inherit from him and his issue.
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988). The Supreme Court specifically ap-
plied the Trimble holding to the former statute in Reed v. Campbell, 106 S. Ct. 2234, 90 L. Ed.
2d 858 (1986).
122. 730 S.W.2d at 163.
123. 727 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
124. Id. at 628.
125. Id. at 626-28.
126. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.24 (Vernon 1986) provides:
A statement acknowledging paternity or an obligation to support a child which
was signed by the father before January 1, 1974, is valid and binding even
though the statement is not executed as provided in Section 13.22 of this code
and is not filed with the Texas Department of Human Services or with the court.
127. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
128. 727 S.W.2d at 627. The court noted that "[tIhe purpose of Chapter 13 of the Family
Code is to establish a court procedure for determination of paternity." Id.
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rather than to serve as prima facie evidence of paternity. 129 The court noted
that the legislature did not include Family Code section 13.24,30 in the pro-
visions of Probate Code section 42(b), and that the legislature must have
excluded a reference to section 13.24 intentionally. 131 The court then noted
that Seyffert did not allege that she had been legitimated.1 32 Further, the
court stated that the fact that Briggs "recognized" Seyffert as his daughter
did not meet the requirements of section 42(b), which other courts have held
to be the only means through which an illegitimate child may inherit from
his or her father. 133 The court concluded that Seyffert did not have standing
because she failed to allege a justiciable interest and that the trial court
should have dismissed the suit rather than merely striking Seyffert's
pleadings. 134
IV. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
Jurisdiction. In Bowen v. Hazel 135 the court determined that a district court
had properly dismissed a case for lack of jurisdiction after a county court,
sitting in probate, had entered a final judgment on the same issue. 136 The
court did not overrule the possibility of an appeal of the probate court's
judgment. 137 The executor of an estate filed an inventory, appraisement, and
list of claims in the probate court. The inventory did not include several
certificates of deposit and bank accounts, which the executor concluded were
not probate assets since they were joint accounts with right of survivorship.
The executor was also the joint tenant who had survivorship rights in each
of these accounts. The beneficiaries under the decedent's will challenged the
inventory because they felt that the accounts actually should have been in-
cluded in the probate estate. The probate court ordered the executor to re-
turn some of the funds to the estate. The executor filed for declaratory
judgment on this matter in the district court, which found that it lacked
jurisdiction because the order of the probate court was a final order that
could be appealed in the court of appeals.
The court of appeals first noted that probate matters are different from
other matters in that a probate court's order may be appealed if the order
"finally adjudicates some substantial right [although it] does not fully and
129. 727 S.W.2d at 627.
130. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.24 (Vernon 1986).
131. 727 S.W.2d at 627-28.
132. Id. at 628. The court indicated that Seyffert could have brought a paternity suit and
proven paternity using Briggs's statement, which would have legitimated her by court decree.
Id. Through this legitimation procedure, Seyffert could then have inherited from Briggs. See
id.
133. Id. See, e.g., In re Estate of Castaneda, 687 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1985, no writ); Mills v. Edwards, 665 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1983, no writ); Batchelor v. Batchelor, 634 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
134. 727 S.W.2d at 628. The court dismissed the cause without prejudice. Id.
135. 723 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987, no writ).
136. Id. at 797.
137. Id.
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finally dispose of the entire probate proceeding." 1 38 The court determined
that the probate court's order here finally adjudicated a substantial right and
that the district court properly dismissed the case. 139 The concurring opin-
ion stated that the district court lacked jurisdiction irrespective of whether
the county court's order was final because a county court exercising probate
jurisdiction has exclusive jurisdiction over all matters incident to the
estate. 140
The court in DeBlanc v. Renfrow 14' determined that the district court had
jurisdiction to hear a cause of action after the county court had sustained a
plea in abatement against the claim the plaintiffs first brought in that
court. 142 The plaintiffs, two of the decedent's surviving sisters, alleged that
the decedent established two joint tenancy with right of survivorship ac-
counts with them. The defendant, a niece of the decedent, was appointed
independent executor of the estate and the estate entered independent ad-
ministration. 143 The plaintiffs filed their claim in the county court, but the
county court sustained the defendant's plea in abatement because it reasoned
that the plaintiffs' claim was not a claim against the decedent's estate. The
plaintiffs then brought an action in the district court. The defendant made a
plea to the jurisdiction of the court in which she alleged that the district
court did not have jurisdiction and that the plaintiffs had already appeared
in county court on this matter. The district court dismissed the cause with-
out prejudice because it found that the court did not have jurisdiction.
The appeals court first noted that the plaintiffs would not have a forum
since the county court abated their claim and the district court dismissed the
cause for lack of jurisdiction.'I" The court then analyzed the jurisdiction of
138. Id.
139. Id. The court also noted that the district court was correct in dismissing the case
because the county court, sitting in probate, had exclusive jurisdiction until such time as a
party to the proceeding or the county court itself moved to transfer the proceeding to the
district court pursuant to TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988). 723 S.W.2d at
797. The district court also could have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because of
the action pending in the county court, involving the same parties and the same issues, at the
time the action was filed. Id.
140. 723 S.W.2d 797-98 (Grant, J., concurring). TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(d) (Vernon
1980) provides: "All courts exercising original jurisdiction shall have the power to hear all
matters incident to an estate." The concurrence noted that whether an asset is part of the
probate estate is necessarily a matter incident to the estate, and that the legislature codified the
policy of settling all matters incident to the estate in one proceeding. 723 S.W.2d at 798
(Grant, J., concurring).
141. 728 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
142. Id. at 411.
143. Id. at 410.
144. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 145(h) (Vernon 1980) provides:
When an independent administration has been created, and the order appointing
an independent executor has been entered by the county court, and the inven-
tory, appraisement, and list aforesaid has been filed by the executor and ap-
proved by the county court, as long as the estate is represented by an
independent executor, further action of any nature shall not be had in the
county court except where this Code specifically and explicitly provides for
some action in the county court.
The county court sustained the plea in abatement because the estate had entered an independ-
ent administration.
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the county court and the district court.145 The court concluded that with
certain exceptions the district court has original probate jurisdiction, and
that the district court here had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' case. 146
In Graham v. Graham 147 the court determined that the constitutional
county court properly exercised jurisdiction over the heirs and the subject
matter in an intestacy probate proceeding.148 The court noted that a consti-
tutional county court has general probate jurisdiction under the Probate
Code, 149 but "that jurisdictional power is dormant jurisdiction until it is
awakened in the correct manner."1 50 The court found that the county court
rendered a judgment without apparent defect, reciting that the plaintiff had
activated jurisdiction,' 5' which means that only a direct attack may set aside
the judgment.' 52 The court determined that the service of process satisfied
due process considerations. '53 The court held that the county court also had
subject matter jurisdiction, even though the county court had to determine
title to land in the proceeding, which normally is reserved to the district
court. 154
Standing. Three courts examined the issue of standing during the Survey
period. 155 In Klein v. Dimock 156 the court determined that beneficiaries
under a will that was not admitted to probate had no standing to bring a
trespass to try title suit against the beneficiaries of the will that was admitted
to probate. ' 57 The court found that the appellants had no interest in the
property to give them standing. 158 The decedent had executed a deed con-
veying land to the appellees in 1973, but he neither delivered the deed to the
appellees nor recorded it. Shortly after his death the deed was found. In
1961 the decedent executed a joint will under which the appellants would
have taken the land involved in the trespass to try title action. 159 The dece-
dent executed a new will in 1981, which was subsequently admitted to pro-
145. 728 S.W.2d at 410-11.
146. Id. at 411.
147. 733 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
148. Id. at 378.
149. Id. at 377; see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 4 (Vernon 1980).
150. 733 S.W.2d at 377. In order to activate the court's jurisdiction, "persons or property
over which the court has potential jurisdiction must be brought before the court by service of
process that (1) is consistent with due process and (2) follows, with reasonable strictness, the
procedure designed by the state for notification of the pending action." Id.
151. Id. at 378.
152. Id. at 377 (citing Akers v. Simpson, 445 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex. 1969)).
153. Id. at 378.
154. Id. The Probate Code provides that "courts exercising original probate jurisdiction
shall have the power to hear all matters incident to an estate." TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(d)
(Vernon 1980).
155. Seyffert v. Briggs, 727 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Klein v. Dimock, 719 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ dism'd); InterFirst
Bank v. Estate of Henderson, 719 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, no writ). For a
discussion of Seyffert v. Briggs, see supra notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
156. 719 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ dism'd).
157. Id. at 412.
158. Id.
159. The appeals court had previously affirmed the trial court's decision not to admit the
1961 joint will to probate because the two-year statute of limitations had run since the 1981
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bate, in which he left the real property to the appellees. The appellees also
filed the 1973 deed after the appellants filed the trespass to try title suit. The
appeals court determined that the probate of the 1981 will eliminated the
possibility that the appellants had any interest in the property, thus the ap-
pellants had no standing to bring a trespass to try title action. 160
In InterFirst Bank v. Estate of Henderson 161 the court considered the issue
of whether the trustee of a testamentary trust is an interested person with
standing to contest the probate of a will.' 62 The court stated that an inter-
ested person entitled to contest the probate of a will is normally considered
to be a person with a pecuniary interest, whether as an individual or as a
fiduciary, that the court's action in admitting the will to probate or refusing
to admit the will to probate will affect. 163 The court noted that other juris-
dictions had considered the issue of whether a trustee under a testamentary
trust had standing to contest the probate of a subsequent will and that these
jurisdictions had determined that the testamentary trustee had substantially
more interest than a named executor, especially if the trustee represented the
interests of beneficiaries adversely affected by the subsequent will.' 4 The
court reversed and remanded the cause for transfer to the district court for a
determination of whether the trustee is an interested person with standing to
contest the probate of the subsequent will.' 65
Burden of Proof. The Fort Worth court of appeals, in Mahon v. Dovers,'66
affirmed the trial court's judgment that the proponent of a will failed to meet
her burden of proof that the document she offered for probate was the dece-
dent's validly executed will. 167 Leon Mahon executed a will on May 21,
1985. Three witnesses and a notary public signed the will. Mahon signed
the bottom of each page of the will. The proponent offered a will for probate
as the will Mahon executed in May 1985. The trial court found that Mahon
had validly executed a will in May 1985 but that he had made changes in the
will without the requisite formalities and the court therefore denied pro-
will had been admitted to probate. Klein v. Dimock, 705 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
160. 719 S.W.2d at 412.
161. 719 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, no writ).
162. Id. at 643. The court also determined that the trial court erred in dismissing the will
contest after providing written notice that the hearing would be for the consideration of the
motion to transfer probate proceedings to district court. Id. at 642. The court noted that the
trial court must have provided the parties with notice that the hearing would consider the
dismissal of the will contest in order to satisfy due process requirements. Id.
163. Id. at 643; see Logan v. Thomason, 146 Tex. 37, 41, 202 S.W.2d 212, 215 (1947);
Appleby v. Tom, 170 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1942, no writ).
164. 719 S.W.2d at 643 (citing O'Leary v. McGuinness, 140 Conn. 80, 98 A.2d 660, 663
(1953); Johnston v. Willis, 147 Md. 237, 127 A. 862, 864-65 (1925); Kuburich v. Popovich (In
re Estate of Maricich), 140 Mont. 319, 371 P.2d 354, 356 (1962); In re Rogers' Estate, 15 N.J.
Super. 189, 83 A.2d 268, 275 (Essex County Ct., Prob. Div. 1951)).
165. 719 S.W.2d at 643. The bank was named both executor and trustee of the testamen-
tary trust. The appeals court limited the district court's consideration of whether the bank is
an interested party to consideration of the bank's role as trustee. Id.
166. 730 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
167. Id. at 470.
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bate. 168 The appeals court noted that the proponent of a will always has the
burden of proving that a will offered for probate was executed with the nec-
essary requisites. 169 The appeals court found that the trial court concluded
that it could not determine if the offered document was the same will that
Mahon executed in May 1985 based on evidence, so the appeals court con-
cluded that the trial court's finding of fact was not against the great weight
and preponderance of evidence. 170
Appellate Procedure. In Grounds v. Lett 171 the Dallas court of appeals deter-
mined that the trial court interlocutorily denied a motion to transfer venue,
overruled a plea to jurisdiction, and granted a motion to transfer a case
pending in another county. 172 The Corpus Christi court of appeals held that
an appellant's failure either to file a transcript within sixty days of perfection
of a writ of error or to file a motion for extension of time in which to file the
transcript would result in dismissal of the appeal. 173 The supreme court re-
versed the Texarkana court of appeals in First State Bank & Trust v. Mc-
Carty 174 and remanded the case to the trial court. 17 5 The court of appeals
had rendered a verdict in the case, 176 but failed to consider the bank's claim
against a third part in reversing and rendering the judgment for the Mc-
Cartys. The supreme court held that the rendition by the court of appeals
violated rule 81 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 177 and reversed
and remanded the case to the trial court for the bank to litigate its claim
against the third party. 
17 8
168. The trial court heard testimony that Mahon would unstaple his will, remove pages
and retype them with the changes he wished to make, then restaple the document. He signed
the bottom of each new page. A documents examiner testified that the paper and type were
consistent throughout the will and that he thought Mahon signed each page at the same time.
The documents examiner admitted, however, that Mahon's signature did not change signifi-
cantly from the time he executed the will in May 1985 until shortly before his death. The trial
court found that the various pages of the document had different numbers of staple holes in
them.
169. 730 S.W.2d at 468; see also In re Estate of Rosborough, 542 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hogan v. Stoepler, 82 S.W.2d 1000, 1002 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1935, no writ). Once a proponent has made a prima facie case that a will
was validly executed, the burden of proof shifts to the contestant to prove that the will was not
validly executed. 730 S.W.2d at 468; see Jones v. Whiteley, 533 S.W.2d 881, 885 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 88 (Vernon 1980).
170. 730 S.W.2d at 470. The appeals court affirmed the trial court's judgment. Id.
171. 718 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
172. Id. at 39. The court noted that none of these orders affected any party's substantial
rights and that further hearings were necessary before the dispute could be adjudicated. Id.
173. Migura v. Migura, 730 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
174. 730 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex. 1987).
175. Id.
176. McCarty v. First State Bank & Trust, 723 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. App.-Texarkana), rev'd,
730 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1987). For a discussion of the court of appeals opinion, see supra notes
100-06 and accompanying text.
177. See TEX. R. App. P. 81. Rule 81(c) provides that "[w]hen the judgment or decree of
the court below shall be reversed, the court shall proceed to render such judgment or decree as
the court below should have rendered, except when it is necessary to remand to the court
below for further proceedings." Id. 81(c).
178. 730 S.W.2d at 657.
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Evidence. The Texas Supreme Court interpreted the Dead Man's Statute, 79
in In re Estate of Watson.180 The decedent's will named her sister as in-
dependent executor and primary beneficiary, while the will excluded other
relatives. The excluded relatives contested the probate of the will, alleging
that the decedent did not have testamentary capacity and that the named
executor exerted undue influence on the decedent. The named executor at-
tempted to introduce many letters written over several years to show the
close relationship between the two sisters, but the trial court ruled that the
letters were inadmissible because of the Dead Man's Statute. The jury found
that the decedent had testamentary capacity, but that the named executor
had exerted undue influence, so the court refused to probate the will and the
estate passed under the intestacy provisions of the Probate Code. 1 8  The
court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in an unpublished
opinion.
The supreme court first noted that the purpose of the Dead Man's Statute
is to ensure fairness, since the death of the speaker prevents the speaker from
rebutting the testimony. 182 The court stated that the focus of the Dead
Man's Statute is on the witness's capacity to testify rather than on the admis-
sibility of evidence of a transaction.183 The named executor offered the let-
ters at trial for the purpose of proving the decedent's affection for her sister,
who was the named executor and primary beneficiary. The supreme court
stated that the trial court should not have excluded the letters under the
Dead Man's Statute because the named executor did not testify about the
letters. 18 4 The court further held that the proponent, the named executor,
could authenticate the letters because this authentication is merely identifica-
tion of handwriting rather than testimony about contents.185 The court held
that the failure to admit the letters into evidence was reversible error, and
the court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.18 6
The Texarkana court of appeals in Tuttle v. Simpson 187 examined a will to
determine if it were ambiguous so that a party could introduce extrinsic evi-
dence to explain the ambiguity.188 The court also decided on the applicabil-
179. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (Vernon 1926), repealed by Texas Rules of
Evidence, eff. Sept. 1, 1983, by order of the Texas Supreme Court under Rules of Practice Act,
ch. 25, § 1, 1939 Tex. Gen. Laws 201, 201, repealed by Act of June 12, 1985, ch. 480, § 26(1),
1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 2048. This rule of evidence is now found in TEX. R. EVID. 601(b).
180. 720 S.W.2d 806 (rex. 1986).
181. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 38 (Vernon 1980).
182. 720 S.W.2d at 807.
183. Id.
184. Id. The court added that no hearsay problem existed because the named executor did
not offer the letters to prove the truth of any matter asserted within them. Id. The court
stated that letters showing an affectionate relationship may properly be used to rebut evidence
that the parties did not have a good relationship. Id.
185. Id. at 807-08. The court noted that the rules of evidence provide other methods of
authentication. Id. (citing TEX. R. EvID. 901(b)).
186. Id. at 808.
187. 735 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987, no writ). For a discussion of the joint
tenancy with rights of survivorship issue, see supra note 114.
188. 735 S.W.2d at 541-42.
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ity of the Dead Man's Statute to testimony heard in the case.189 The trial
court determined that the description of property left to a beneficiary under
the will was ambiguous. 190 The appeals court noted that a court may allow
the admission of extrinsic evidence to clarify ambiguities.' 9' The court then
examined the words of the will, determined that more than one twenty-acre
strip could exist in the northern part of the acreage, and held that the trial
court correctly found that the will was ambiguous.192 The beneficiary of the
twenty acres and another witness testified as to the location of the twenty
acres at trial, but the appeals court found that the Dead Man's Statute ap-
plied to testimony of that sort. 19 3
Family Settlement Agreements. In Leon v. Keith 194 the Waco court of ap-
peals determined that an heir can enter a family settlement agreement with
the sole beneficiary under a will even though the heir was not a beneficiary
under the will. 195 The decedent died in California in 1983 leaving a ho-
lographic will that named one of the decedent's two surviving sisters as the
sole beneficiary. The decedent's niece, the daughter of the decedent's de-
ceased sister, also survived. The niece alleged that the sole beneficiary of the
will entered into a family settlement agreement with the niece and the other
surviving sister under which the will would be probated but the estate would
be divided equally between the three. The niece alleged that the three en-
tered the agreement prior to the decedent's death and that they reconfirmed
the agreement following the decedent's death. The court noted that heirs
have a well-established right to enter into family settlement agreements in
Texas. 19 6 The court overruled Manning v. Sammons 19 7 to the extent that
the Manning court held that only beneficiaries named in a will can enter a
family settlement agreement.' 98 The court also held that the niece's suit for
breach of the alleged family settlement agreement is not a collateral attack
on the probate decree but is instead a different cause of action.1 9
189. Id. at 542-43.
190. The will described the land as a "20 acres strip on the north end' of a 97.85 acre tract
in the E.A. Merchant Survey of Harrison County." Id. at 541.
191. Id. (citing Kelley v. Martin, 714 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. 1986); Lehman v. Corpus
Christi Nat'l Bank, 668 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex. 1984)).
192. 735 S.W.2d at 542.
193. Id. Although the court found that the Dead Man's Statute applies to this type of
testimony, the court found that it only applied to the beneficiary witness because of her adver-
sarial position. See id. The statute did not apply to the other witness, and the court held that
his testimony was proper. Id. at 543. The court also addressed other issues, specifically in-
cluding the survivorship rights on an account designated as a joint tenancy account. Id. at
543-45; see supra note 114.
194. 733 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
195. Id. at 373.
196. Id. (citing Salmon v. Salmon, 395 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex. 1965); Cook v. Hamer, 158
Tex. 164, 167, 309 S.W.2d 54, 56 (1958); Franke v. Cheatham, 157 Tex. 397, 399-401, 303
S.W.2d 355, 357-58 (1957); Wade v. Wade, 140 Tex. 339, 344, 167 S.W.2d 1008, 1010 (1943)).
197. 418 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
198. 733 S.W.2d at 374.
199. Id. at 373, 374. The court also rejected the part of the Manning opinion that held that
a suit against the beneficiary of a will for violating an alleged family settlement agreement is a
collateral attack on the decree admitting the will to probate. Id. at 374.
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In another family settlement agreement case a person named successor
independent executor in a will challenged the agreement; the Amarillo court
of appeals, however, found that he did not have standing to contest the fam-
ily settlement agreement. 200 The decedent left a will in which she specifi-
cally disinherited one of her daughters and directed the executor and
beneficiaries of her will to oppose the disinherited daughter's attempts to
attack the validity of the will. The decedent also ordered that any benefici-
ary under the will who initiated an attack on the will be disinherited. The
disinherited daughter brought a will contest, in which she alleged that her
mother was not competent to make a will and that others exerted undue
influence over her mother. The person named independent executor died
while the will contest was pending. Rather than naming the successor in-
dependent executor named in the will as temporary administrator of the es-
tate, the trial court named the daughter who was not disinherited. Shortly
before the will contest went to trial, the family entered a family settlement
agreement, under which the disinherited daughter would receive a share of
the estate and the estate would be freed to pay creditors. The named succes-
sor executor objected to the family settlement agreement and insisted that
the court should probate the will as it was written and that he should be
named independent executor. The probate court held that the successor in-
dependent executor had no standing to object to the family settlement agree-
ment. The probate court approved the family settlement agreement. The
named successor executor appealed.
The appeals court first noted that the law looks with favor on family set-
tlement agreements. 20 1 The court also noted that an executor who has no
interest in the estate in any capacity other than that as executor does not
have standing to contest a family settlement agreement. 20 2 The court held
200. In re Estate of Hodges, 725 S.W.2d 265, 267 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
201. Id. The court stated that the property immediately passed to the named beneficiaries
when the decedent died. Id. The beneficiaries could thus agree to distribute the property
among themselves as they wished without waiting for the actual distribution of the property
from the estate. Id.
202. Id. at 268. For a discussion of standing, see supra notes 155-65 and accompanying
text. The named successor executor asserted that he had standing because he had a duty to
enforce the will's forfeiture clause. The court noted that courts should strictly construe forfei-
ture clauses and should avoid enforcement of the clauses if possible. Id. The court determined
that the forfeiture clause here was inapplicable because the family requested a declaratory
judgment from the probate court on whether the family settlement agreement would result in
forfeiture, which is a will construction question, not in itself an attack on the will. Id. Thus,
the successor executor had no duties under the forfeiture clause of the will. Id. The court
additionally noted that the named successor executor had no action to take under the forfei-
ture clause because if the beneficiaries forfeited their interests under the will by entering the
family settlement agreement, the estate would pass by intestacy, after which the two daughters
of the decedent would have a contractual obligation to distribute the estate under the terms of
the family settlement agreement. Id. The court also quickly discarded the notion that the
named successor independent executor had standing because he received a pecuniary interest
under the will for compensation for his services. Id. at 268-69. The court noted that the
compensation clause did not appear to apply to a successor independent executor, but instead
only to the named independent executor. Id. at 269. Finally, the court noted that the will was
admitted to probate as a muniment of title for limited purposes only, so the named successor
independent executor was not needed in the capacity of executor. Id. at 270-71.
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that no reason existed for issuing letters testamentary to the named succes-
sor executor and affirmed the judgment of the probate court.20 3
Temporary Administration. The Beaumont court of appeals held in Moser v.
Norred2° 4 that a probate court has wide latitude to appoint a temporary
administrator of an estate if the court finds that the estate needs the immedi-
ate attention of an administrator. 20 5 The probate court first granted letters
of temporary administration to the decedent's nephew, who stated in his
application that the estate required immediate attention and that the appli-
cant expected a will contest. The application for appointment as temporary
administrator had attached to it a copy of the decedent's alleged holographic
will. The decedent's surviving spouse shortly thereafter filed a contest
against the appointment of the nephew as temporary administrator and al-
ternatively applied for appointment of himself as temporary administrator in
lieu of the nephew. The court sitting in probate noted that a will contest was
pending, discharged the nephew as temporary administrator, and appointed
a disinterested third party as temporary administrator. The decedent's hus-
band appealed. The appeals court stated that the trial court's statements
and order showed the existence of a suit to determine the validity of the
alleged holographic will; the appointment of a disinterested third party as a
temporary administrator therefore was proper. 20 6
Executors and Administrators. The Amarillo court of appeals imposed dam-
ages, payable to heirs of a deceased testatrix, on the executor and trustees of
a trust, the corpus of which was comprised of the decedent's estate, estab-
lished by the executor. 20 7 The court of appeals noted that this appeal was
the third arising from proceedings involving this estate.20 8 Following the
second appeal the trial court amended the final account and ordered the
executor to distribute the estate. The executor and the trustees of the trust
203. Id. at 271.
204. 720 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ).
205. Id. at 871.
206. Id.
207. In re Estate of Diggs, 733 S.W.2d 681, 688 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, no writ).
208. Id. at 683. The executor first appealed when the trial court determined that the de-
ceased's holographic will named co-executors, but did not provide for the disposition of her
estate. The trial court ordered that the estate should pass by intestacy to the decedent's heirs
at law. The executors argued that they had the right to distribute the estate as they wished.
The appeals court affirmed the trial court's judgment. Preston v. Preston, 617 S.W.2d 841
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Following this first appeal one executor
created a trust using estate funds. The beneficiaries of this trust included a church, a library, a
museum, and a person who was not an heir at law of the decedent. The trust also provided
that the trustees could, in their discretion, provide distributions to themselves and to heirs at
law. The heirs applied for a final accounting and distribution of the estate, and the trial court
determined that the executor had no authority to establish the trust, ordered the executor to
file the final accounting, and ordered the executor to distribute the estate to the heirs at law by
a specific date. The executor appealed the judgment and asserted that the property passed to
the two named executors for them to distribute as they wished. The other named executor had
resigned as executor by the time of the second appeal. The appeals court affirmed the trial
court in an unpublished opinion. The appeals court held that this matter had previously been
resolved on the first appeal when the appeals court affirmed the judgment that the property
passed by descent and distribution to the heirs at law.
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established by the executor appealed, listing fifty points of error. The ap-
peals court noted that the appellants listed no authority for many of these
points of error.2° 9 The court overruled every point of error,2 10 then ad-
dressed the matter of the executor's refusal to distribute the estate as the trial
court had ordered. 21 1 The court found that the appellants had sought this
appeal merely for the purpose of delay; the court expressed its concern that
the unnecessary appeal was a waste of valuable time during which the court
of appeals could have considered meritorious appeals. 2 12
In Rivera v. Morales21 3 the court held that an executory contract for the
sale of land is the same as a mortgage for probate purposes in that both are
"money claims. ' 21 4 The decedent died intestate in February 1983. At the
time of his death he had made all monthly payments through the January
payment. The decedent's spouse, who married the decedent after he had
entered the sales contract, was named administrator of his estate in April
1983. The decedent's spouse tendered the May payment, which the sellers
refused. The administrator had not made the February through April pay-
ments, and the sellers decided to cancel the sales contract under the forfei-
ture clause contained in the contract. The trial court found that the
forfeiture clause was effective, and the administrator appealed, contending
that the sellers should have presented a claim to the probate court.215 The
court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered judg-
ment disallowing the forfeiture. 21 6
The Dallas court of appeals held that the probate court has jurisdiction
over a cause of action by the estate of a deceased shareholder against the
209. See Diggs, 733 S.W.2d at 684-86. The appellants also failed to follow the format for
an appeals brief, and inundated the appeals court with lengthy and unnecessary motions. See
id. at 687.
210. Id. at 686-87.
211. Id. at 687. The court noted that the executor and the trustees refused to recognize the
authority of the court. The court included testimony of one of the trustees, in which the
trustee stated that the opinion of the appeals court "does not have the force of law, and it is not
law." Id. The court noted in a footnote that it found the appeal strange when the appellants
did not respect the opinion of the court of appeals. Id. n.3.
212. Id. at 687. The court therefore awarded damages to the appellees to compensate for
the unnecessary delay on the part of the executor and the trustees. Id. at 687-88.
213. 733 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
214. Id. at 678-79. The court noted the distinction between the two for purposes of trans-
fer of title and the right of forfeiture and repossession, but determined that no distinction
existed between the two for the purpose of presentment of claims to the estate of the deceased
purchaser. Id. at 679.
215. The Probate Code defines a claim to "include liabilities of a decedent which survive,
including taxes, whether arising in contract or tort or otherwise ...." TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 3 (Vernon 1980). The creditor has six months to present the claim after the personal
representative of the estate qualifies. Id. § 298. The secured creditor has the option of having
"the claim allowed and approved as a matured secured claim to be paid in due course of
administration" or having the claim treated "as a preferred debt and lien against the specific
property securing the indebtedness and paid according to the terms of the contract which
secured the lien . Id. § 306(a).
216. 733 S.W.2d at 679. The concurring opinion stated that since evidence existed that the
decedent intended to use this property as a residence, the sellers should have additionally had
to comply with the provision requiring sellers to give purchasers sixty days' notice of an intent
to enforce a forfeiture clause in an installment land contract. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§§ 5.061-.063 (Vernon 1983).
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other two shareholders in a closely held corporation. 217 The three share-
holders incorporated in 1981 for the purpose of selling oilfield equipment.
None of the shareholders, who were equal owners of the business, made con-
tributions to the corporation in exchange for his stock. The decedent served
as president of the corporation from the date of incorporation until his death
in 1982. After the decedent's death the other two shareholders began the
process of winding up the business. They distributed assets of the corpora-
tion to themselves, but made no distributions to the decedent's estate. They
did not formally dissolve the corporate shell. The successor executor of the
estate brought an action to compel the two shareholders to contribute the
decedent's share of the business assets, determined as of the date of his
death, to his estate. The trial court entered judgment for the estate and
found that the corporation was the alter ego of the two shareholders, which
meant that the estate could recover from them individually. The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court2 18 and reformed the judgment only to the
extent of one item of damages, which was counted twice. 2 19
The Waco court of appeals held that a trial court properly could take
judicial notice of the murder conviction of the decedent's husband when ap-
pointing an administrator in an estate when the same judge signed the appli-
cant's murder conviction. 220 The decedent's husband applied for
appointment as administrator of the estate. The trial judge made a fact find-
ing that the husband had been convicted of murder in the same court and
appointed another to serve as executor. The husband appealed, asserting
that the record made no mention of his murder conviction, which was under
appeal at that time. The court of appeals found that under these circum-
stances the trial court could take judicial notice of its own judgment. 22'
V. GUARDIANSHIPS
In Hernandez v. Borjas222 the court affirmed an order that denied the ap-
217. Francis v. Beaudry, 733 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
218. Id. at 335. The court of appeals found that not only did the estate have a cause of
action against the shareholders in their individual capacities on the alter ego theory, but that it
also had a cause of action against them on a theory known as "denuding the corporation." Id.
The court cited World Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Bass, 160 Tex. 261, 266-67, 328 S.W.2d
863, 866 (1959) for this theory. In the World Broadcasting decision the supreme court held
that the shareholders who stripped a corporation of its assets were liable to the corporation's
creditors to the extent they benefitted. 160 Tex. at 266-67, 328 S.W.2d at 866.
219. 733 S.W.2d at 337, 338.
220. Bryan v. Blue, 724 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tex. App.-Waco 1986, no writ). The husband
was convicted of murdering his wife, the decedent here. The Probate Code provides that "[n]o
person is qualified to serve as an executor or administrator of an estate who is... a convicted
felon ... unless such person has been duly pardoned, or his civil rights restored, in accordance
with law." TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 78(c) (Vernon 1980). Further, a trial court may refuse
to appoint any person the court finds unsuitable to serve as executor. Id. § 78(f).
221. 724 S.W.2d at 402. The court of appeals noted that a person convicted of a felony
whose conviction is under appeal still is unable to serve as a personal representative of an
estate. Id. at 402 (citing Smith v. Christley, 684 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
222. 734 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
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plication for the removal of a court-appointed guardian.223 The court ap-
pointed Jenaro Borjas the guardian of his sister's four minor children when
she died. Approximately six years later the two children who were still mi-
nors moved in with Manuel Ventura Hernandez. The two children then
filed a "Selection of Guardian" with the court, pursuant to section 118(b) of
the Probate Code, 224 in which they requested that the court name Her-
nandez as their guardian. Hernandez filed an application for the court to
remove Borjas as guardian, alleging that Borjas had forced the children from
his home and had not helped to support the children from the guardianship
estate since that time. The trial court heard only the application for removal
and determined that no cause existed for removal. The trial court did not
hear the children's request for selection of guardian. The court of appeals
noted that the application for removal of guardian and the "Selection of
Guardian," while similar in result, are different actions. 225 In order for the
court to grant an application for removal the applicant must prove that the
current guardian has failed in his duty in some manner defined in the Pro-
bate Code. 2 2 6 The court must only find that the person the minor requests
to be named guardian in a "Selection of Guardian" is suitable and competent
in order for the court to name the requested person guardian. 227 The ap-
peals court noted that evidence existed to support the positions of both
Borjas and Hernandez. 228 The point of error Hernandez raised on appeal
did not state whether it was raising factual insufficiency, but the appeals
court determined that this was the intent.229 The appeals court found that
sufficient evidence existed to support the trial court's implied factual findings
that no cause existed for the removal of Borjas as the children's guardian. 230
The court determined in Baumann v. Willis231 that the guardian of a per-
son who had been adjudicated incompetent does not have the right to pos-
sess the ward's will when no evidence exists that the ward intends to destroy
the will or that the guardian needs the will to administer the guardian-
ship.232 The appellee in this case had represented the ward, Mrs. Rauh, for
many years prior to the declaration of incompetency. Mrs. Rauh's daughter,
who was later named guardian, had attempted to secure possession of the
will prior to the declaration of her mother's incompetency. Mrs. Rauh di-
rected the attorney not to deliver the will to her daughter or to anyone else,
nor to disclose the contents of the will, prior to her death. Mrs. Rauh was
declared incompetent in 1981. In 1985 her guardian attempted to force the
223. Id. at 780.
224. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 118(b) (Vernon 1980). This section allows minors who
have reached fourteen years of age to request the court to select a guardian of the child's
choosing if the court finds that the requested guardian is suitable. Id
225. 734 S.W.2d at 778.
226. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 222 (Vernon 1980).
227. See id. § 118.
228. 734 S.W.2d at 779.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 780.
231. 721 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
232. Id. at 538.
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attorney to deliver the will to her. The trial court concluded that the guard-
ian "had failed to show a legal right to take physical possession of her ward's
last will and testament. '233 The appeals court determined that a will is not
property as the Probate Code defines the term.234
VI. TRUSTS
Charitable Corporations. In Blocker v. State235 the court affirmed the trial
court's judgment that imposed a constructive public charitable trust upon
the assets of a dissolved charitable corporation under the cy pres doctrine. 236
In the 1930s the Hammond family created a charitable corporation, the
Houston Conservatory of Music (HCM), with the purpose of teaching music
and associated arts. Mozart B. Hammond gave land in Houston to HCM in
1941. HCM acquired another location in 1950 and subsequently sold the
land Hammond gave it. In 1963 HCM sold the property it acquired in 1950
and bought property on Milford Street in Houston, which housed HCM un-
til 1984. Mozart B. Hammond died in 1982. Hammond left all of his prop-
erty equally to three devisees. Following Hammond's death all three of
these devisees and their mother became directors of HCM. The directors
determined that the only assets of the corporation were the Milford Street
property and the musical instruments HCM owned. The directors decided
to dissolve the corporation, pay any liabilities, and distribute the assets to
Hammond's estate. The directors then deeded the Milford Street property
to Hammond's estate. The attorney general brought this action to void the
conveyance of the property. The trial court concluded that the deed was
void. The trial court additionally awarded the Milford Street property and
personalty to a newly created charitable corporation that had a similar pur-
pose to HCM's under the cy pres doctrine. The directors appealed from the
trial court's judgment, asserting that they followed the provisions of article
1396-6.02A of the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act 237 in dissolving HCM.
233. Id. at 536.
234. 721 S.W.2d at 537-38; see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 3(z), 3(cc), 230(b)(1), 232, 233
(Vernon 1980). The court affirmed the trial court's judgment. 721 S.W.2d at 538. The court
also determined that the guardian was not entitled to attorney's fees because these fees are not
within the meaning of costs to the estate. Id.
235. 718 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
236. Id. at 416. The cy pres doctrine allows a court the equitable power to carry out the
purpose of a charitable trust or charitable corporation as closely as possible to the particular
intent of the person or persons who established the trust or corporation, even though the
particular purpose cannot be fulfilled for some reason. Id. at 415 (citing Wooten v. Fitz-
Gerald, 440 S.W.2d 719, 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Coffee v. Wil-
liam Marsh Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269, 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1966, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 349 (5th ed. 1979)).
237. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-6.02A (Vernon 1980), amended by Act of
June 15, 1985, ch. 682, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 2464, 2464-65. This article applies to the
application and distribution of the assets of a dissolved nonprofit corporation. The directors
must first apply the assets to satisfy all liabilities. Id art. 1396-6.02A(1). The directors must
then return or convey any assets that the corporation holds that must be returned or conveyed
at the time the corporation is dissolved. Id. art. 1396-6.02A(2). The directors must next trans-
fer any assets that the corporation holds that must be applied for a limited charitable purpose
so that they can continue to be used for that purpose. Id. art. 1396-6.02A(3). The directors
may then distribute any other assets in accordance with provisions in the articles of incorpora-
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The appeals court first determined that neither the stipulated facts nor the
trial record showed that HCM had any liabilities or debts at the time it was
dissolved.2 38 The court discounted the idea that the distribution of the real
estate to Hammond's estate served as posthumous compensation for his
years of dedicated service to HCM, thus falling within the scope of a corpo-
rate obligation that must be paid under the dissolution provisions of the
Non-Profit Corporation Act.239 The court next determined that the direc-
tors improperly attempted to distribute HCM's real property to Hammond's
estate under the statutory provision that allows distributions to specified per-
sons or organizations under a statutory distribution plan.24° The court held
that all property that HCM received over the years, including the gift of real
estate Hammond deeded to HCM, were gifts given with the understanding
that they would be used for the charitable purposes detailed in HCM's arti-
cles of incorporation. 24' The court held that the attorney general is the ap-
propriate representative of the state to bring an action for the imposition of a
constructive trust.242
Constructive Trusts. In Jackson v. Timmins 243 the court held that the trial
court properly imposed a constructive trust in a one-half interest in land
three children inherited from their parents. 244 A father and one of his sons
purchased a tract of land that contained timber. The title to the land was
taken in the father's name. Two of the children argued that the land passed
in equal shares to all three children when the father died intestate. The
brother who bought the land with his father contended that he owned one-
tion or the bylaws. Id. art. 1396-6.02A(4). Finally, if any assets remain, the directors may
then distribute them to any persons or organizations as specified in a distribution plan adopted
under the terms of the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act. Id. art. 1396-6.02A(5). The appel-
lants here asserted that HCM's assets fell under subsections (1) and (5), and that they permissi-
bly distributed the real estate to Hammond's estate. The attorney general contended that the
provisions of subsection (3) applied, that the property must be distributed to an organization
with a similar charitable purpose.
238. 718 S.W.2d at 413.
239. Id. (analyzing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-6.02A(l) (Vernon 1980)). The
court suggested that continuing the charitable trust to which Hammond devoted so much time
would perhaps be a more appropriate posthumous reward for his efforts. Id.
240. Id. (analyzing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-6.02A(5) (Vernon 1980)). The
court noted that this provision applies only when the preceding four paragraphs have been
satisfied. Id. The court also determined that neither art. 1396-6.02A(2) nor art. 1396-
6.02A(3) applied. Id.
241. 718 S.W.2d at 415. The court also held that by accepting donations HCM established
a charitable trust just as effectively as if the donors expressly limited the use of their donations.
Id. As such, the directors had an express statutory duty to distribute HCM's assets to charita-
ble organizations established for purposes similar to those of HCM. Id. The court paid partic-
ular attention to the fact that three of the directors would directly benefit from the distribution
of the real property to Hammond's estate. See id. The court noted the policy reasons against
interpreting art. 1396-6.02A(3) in a manner that would allow directors of charitable corpora-
tion to dissolve the corporations in order to benefit personally. Id. at 415-16.
242. Id. at 416. The court found that HCM contracted with the state through the articles
of incorporation, which stated the charitable purpose of the corporation; the Hammonds thus
established HCM as a public charitable trust, which would continue in perpetuity, and which
the state through the attorney general could enforce as it can any public charitable trust. Id.
243. 733 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1987, no writ).
244. Id. at 356.
1988]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
half the land outright as his property and another one-sixth under intestate
succession. The jury found that a confidential relationship existed between
the father and the son with whom the father purchased the property. The
appeals court found that sufficient evidence existed to support the jury's find-
ing 245 and that this evidence established the elements of a constructive
trust.2 4 6
A typical banking relationship between a bank and a customer, however,
is not a confidential relationship, and one court refused to impose a con-
structive trust based upon a banking relationship. 24 7 W.H. McWilliams was
a director and employee of Consolidated Bearing & Supply Company, a
closely held corporation. Consolidated issued McWilliams a stock certificate
for 7500 shares in 1976. The face of the certificate contained a notice of a
restriction on the transfer of the stock. In 1979 McWilliams, who was still
employed by Consolidated, borrowed a large sum of money from the bank
and pledged the stock certificate as collateral. McWilliams then used the
money to engage in business in direct competition with Consolidated. The
bank did not inform Consolidated of McWilliams's pledge of the stock cer-
tificate. Consolidated learned of McWilliams's outside business ventures ap-
proximately one year after McWilliams pledged the stock certificate.
Shortly thereafter, Consolidated terminated McWilliams's employment.
McWilliams subsequently died and left a large portion of the loan unpaid.
The bank then foreclosed and had the sheriff sell the 7500 shares of stock.
Consolidated attempted to have the sheriff's sale set aside, based either upon
the restriction on transferability or upon a constructive trust theory. Con-
solidated alleged that the bank owed Consolidated a fiduciary duty because
of the banking relationship between Consolidated and the bank to inform
Consolidated when McWilliams pledged his stock certificate. The trial court
found that no confidential relationship existed between Consolidated and the
bank and that the bank did not owe Consolidated a fiduciary duty. The
appeals court noted that a party must prove more than a prior business rela-
tionship in order to prove that a confidential relationship existed. 248 The
court concluded that an ordinary banking relationship such as existed be-
245. Id.
246. Id. at 357. The evidence showed a confidential relationship between the purchasing
son and his father, and that the son relied on the confidential relationship in agreeing that his
father would take title to the property in his name. The father died without deeding the son's
interest in the property to him as promised. A constructive trust thus protects the son's inter-
est. The court also mentioned that although the other two children were innocent, their title
was subject to the constructive trust brought about by their father's failure to convey the
property as he had promised. Id.; see also Pope v. Garrett, 147 Tex. 18, 24-25, 211 S.W.2d
559, 562 (1948) (policy against unjust enrichment supports the imposition of a constructive
trust because the innocent defendants would not have inherited any interests in the property
but for the wrongful acts of a third party).
247. Consolidated Bearing & Supply Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 720 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ).
248. Id. at 649. The court stated that a confidential relationship arises from a fiduciary
relationship or from "informal social, moral or personal relationships." Id. One party may
establish that a confidential relationship existed between businesses if that party can prove that
the relationship had been continuous and lengthy and that the party had a justified expectation
that it could rely on the other party to act in its best interests. Id.
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tween the bank and Consolidated did not give rise to a confidential
relationship.249
Resulting Trust. In Estate of Lee v. Ring 2-0 the court held that letters that a
decedent wrote to one of his creditors, in which the decedent stated that he
was conveying his interest in land to the creditor in exchange for the release
of his debt, constituted some evidence that no resulting trust existed. 25' The
decedent had been employed by a real estate development company, and he
was entitled to receive property in exchange for his services. The decedent
arranged with his employer to have the employer deed the property directly
to his creditor. The employer did so, and the letters the decedent wrote the
creditor indicated that the transfer was made in partial satisfaction of the
debt. The court noted that a resulting trust arises at the moment that title
passes if title is taken in the name of someone other than one who pays the
purchase price for the property or if an express trust fails. 252 The court
determined that some evidence existed that the decedent intended to convey
the land to the creditor in satisfaction of his debt, and that the decedent's
administrator failed to carry her burden of proving that the decedent and the
creditor intended a resulting trust at the time title was conveyed to the
creditor.2 53
Spendthrift Trusts. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Phillips v. MBank
Waco, N.A. (In re Latham) 254 applied Texas law concerning both spend-
thrift trusts and garnishment. Lucylle Latham guaranteed a loan that a
bank made to her daughter. Two years later Latham created an irrevocable
trust under the terms of which she was to receive the income for her life,
with the remainder to pass to named contingent beneficiaries at her death.
The trust instrument gave the trustee discretion to invade the trust corpus to
make distributions to Latham for her support and maintenance. The trust
instrument also contained a spendthrift clause. Approximately one year af-
ter Latham created the trust the bank from which her daughter borrowed
money obtained a judgment against Latham as guarantor of the loan. The
bank shortly thereafter served a writ of garnishment based on the judgment
against the trustee. The bank then received a declaratory judgment that it
could reach the trust assets. Within six weeks after the bank received the
declaratory judgment Latham filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy. The bank as-
serted that its lien against the trust assets attached when it served the writ of
garnishment on the trustee, which was prior to the ninety-day preference
period. The bankruptcy court agreed, and the United States district court
249. Id. at 650. The court also noted that McWilliams did not violate the restriction on
transferability when he pledged the stock to secure his loan and that the bank did not violate
the restriction when it bought the stock at the sheriff's sale. Id. at 651.
250. 734 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1987, no writ).
251. Id. at 126.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. 823 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1987).
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affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. 255
The Fifth Circuit noted that under Texas law, which determines the date
of perfection of a lien through garnishment, a lien attaches to assets on the
date the writ is served.256 The court also noted that a spendthrift clause
does not protect a settlor from his or her creditors under Texas law.257 The
court held that the bank perfected its lien prior to the preference period and
that it should receive full satisfaction of the lien, thus affirming the district
court.
2 5 8
A Texas court held that a mother could reach the current income of a
spendthrift trust of which her ex-husband was an income beneficiary to sat-
isfy a judgment she obtained against her ex-husband for unpaid child sup-
port.259 The ex-husband had failed to pay over $25,000 in child support
while his children were under age eighteen. The mother obtained a judg-
ment against the ex-husband for the deficiency, which he failed to pay. The
mother then sought to obtain payment from the trust. The ex-husband had
a beneficial interest only in the net income of the trust, although he was a
contingent beneficiary of the corpus. The trial court found that the mother
could collect the net income of the trust until she collected the full amount
of her judgment. The appeals court affirmed, finding that a spendthrift
clause does not protect a beneficiary from support obligations to his chil-
dren.26° The court held that the mother could recover from the trust income
even though the youngest child was over age eighteen. 261
Trusts and Trustees. A direction to the trustee to divide income equally
among beneficiaries was insufficient to override the statutory allocation of
principal and interest in mineral royalties, 262 according to one CoUrt. 263 The
255. Id. at 109.
256. 823 F.2d at 110. The court noted that the latter order of the bankruptcy court grant-
ing the bank relief from the automatic stay did not determine when the lien attached but
instead only determined the validity of the lien. Id. at 110-11.
257. Id. at 111. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035(d) (Vernon 1984), which provides
that "[i]f the settlor is also a beneficiary of the trust, a provision restraining the voluntary or
involuntary transfer of his beneficial interest does ont prevent his creditors from satisfying
claims from his interest in the trust estate."
258. 823 F.2d at 111.
259. First City Nat'l Bank v. Phelan, 718 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986,
no writ).
260. Id. at 406. The court noted that this result stems from public policy. Id. See G.
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 224 (rev. 2d ed. 1979); 1 A. ScoTr, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS § 157.1 (1939).
261. 718 S.W.2d at 406.
262. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.107(d) (Vernon 1984). This subsection provides:
If the proceeds are received as a royalty, overriding or limited royalty, or bonus
or from a working interest, net profit interest, or any other interest in minerals
or other natural resources, proceeds... shall be apportioned on a yearly basis in
accordance with this subsection .... Twenty-seven and one-half percent of the
gross proceeds, but not to exceed 50 percent of the net, after deducting the ex-
penses and carrying charges on the property, is principal, and the balance is
income.
Id. The trust instrument may override the statutory scheme by specifying the allocation of
principal and interest. See id. § 113.101.
263. InterFirst Bank v. King, 722 S.W.2d 18, 22 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, no writ).
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testator established a trust in his will under which he directed the trustee to
continue operation of certain oil wells and to "divide the income equally" 264
between the beneficiaries. The income beneficiaries contended that the
trustee could distribute net production revenues to the income beneficiaries
without following the statutory allocation formula. The executor of the es-
tate of one of the remainder beneficiaries contended that the terms of the will
did not demonstrate the testator's intent that the trustee should distribute all
net revenue from production as income. The trial court concluded that the
testator intended that the net revenue should be distributed. The appeals
court reversed and rendered. 265 The appeals court found that the language
in the will did not provide a basis for overriding the statutory allocation. 266
The Corpus Christi court of appeals upheld a trial court's removal of a
trustee for engaging in undue influence and improper actions. 267 The trustee
served as fiduciary of a trust for her brothers' benefit. The trustee's parents
established the trust from the remainder interest in their farm; the parents
retained a life estate. The parents conveyed their retained interest to their
daughter in 1981. In 1983 the parents brought this action in which they
sought to remove their daughter as trustee and to recover their life estate in
the farm by setting aside the 1981 conveyance. The jury found that the
daughter had used undue influence to obtain the 1981 conveyance. The
daughter admitted in her testimony that she had, among other things, taken
money from her parents' bank account and used it for her own purposes.
The trial court found that the trustee had tricked her parents into conveying
their life estate to her in 1981. The court accordingly set aside the 1981
conveyance. The trial court also removed the daughter as trustee. The ap-
peals court affirmed the trial court's judgment in both matters. 268
Standing. A father has no standing to sue co-trustees for an alleged breach
of their fiduciary duties, either in his own right as a contingent beneficiary of
the trust or as next friend for his children, the beneficiaries of the trust.269
Howard Davis's mother created a trust for the benefit of his children in
1981. She named Davis's wife and a bank co-trustees of the trust. Davis and
his wife divorced in late 1982. Davis received custody of the children in the
divorce decree, but the decree named his ex-wife managing conservator. Da-
vis brought suit against the co-trustees for allegedly wasting the trust's as-
sets. 270 The trial court found that Davis had no standing to contest the co-
trustees' actions, whether in his own right as a contingent beneficiary or as
264. Id. at 19.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 21.
267. Novak v. Schellenberg, 718 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1986, no
writ).
268, Id. at 825.
269. Davis v. Davis, 734 S.W.2d 707, 709-10 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1987, no
writ).
270. Davis asked the court to remove the co-trustees, appoint a successor trustee, require
an accounting and reimbursement from the co-trustees to the trust corpus, and enjoin the co-
trustees from disposing of other trust assets. Davis also alleged in a second cause of action that
the co-trustees had libeled him.
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next friend for his sons, the beneficiaries. 27 1 The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's summary judgment. 272
VII. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Nontestamentary Transfers. The Seventieth Texas Legislature modified stat-
utes concerning joint tenancy accounts 273 and anatomical gifts. 2 74 The legis-
lature amended Probate Code section 439(a) to add an example of language
sufficient to establish a joint account with rights of survivorship. 275 The leg-
islature amended section 445 to provide that banks that pay funds from a
joint account to a surviving party under the terms of a written agreement as
provided in section 439(a) will not be liable for paying the funds to the heirs,
devisees, or beneficiaries of the decedent's estate. 276 The legislature also
amended section 46 of the Probate Code, with the amendment contingent
upon the passage of the constitutional amendment allowing spouses to agree
to provide survivorship rights in community property.277
271. The trial court made this finding as a matter of law because Davis's ex-wife was man-
aging conservator under the divorce decree. The managing conservator has the right and re-
sponsibility to represent the children in legal actions, whereas the possessory conservator has
no such right. Under the Family Code the managing conservator "retains all the rights, privi-
leges, duties, and powers of a parent to the exclusion of the other parent, subject to the rights,
privileges, duties, and powers of a possessory conservator .... " TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 14.02(a) (Vernon 1986). The possessory conservator has the duty to care for and discipline
the children, the duty to provide food, clothing, and shelter, and the power to authorize emer-
gency medical treatment. Id. § 14.02(a). Additionally, the possessory conservator has the
right to inspect "medical, dental, and educational records of the child to the same extent as the
managing conservator." Id. § 14.04(c). Since the managing conservator has all the duties,
rights, and responsibilities except those reserved for the possessory conservator, the managing
conservator has the "power to represent the child in legal action and to make other decisions
of substantial legal significance concerning the child." Id. § 12.04(7). Section 12.04 of the
Family Code defines the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a parent.
272. 734 S.W.2d at 712.
273. Act of June 11, 1987, ch. 297, §§ 1, 2, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3289, 3289-90
(Vernon); Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 678, § 2, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. 5063, 5068-69
(Vernon).
274. Act of Apr. 22, 1987, ch. 28, §§ 1, 2, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 125, 125-27 (Vernon)
(codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 4590-2(2)(j), -2(8A) (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
275. Act of June 11, 1987, ch. 297, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3289, 3289 (Vernon).
The legislature provided that language in an agreement signed by the party who died, sufficient
to confer a right of survivorship, would substantially state the following: " 'On the death of
one party to a joint account, all sums in the account on the date of the death vest in and belong
to the surviving party as his or her separate property and estate.' " Id. By providing this
statutory example the legislature should eliminate much of the litigation concerning whether
an account established survivorship rights. See supra notes 93-117 and accompanying text.
276. Act of June 11, 1987, ch. 297, § 2, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3289, 3290 (Vernon).
277. Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 678, §§ 1, 2, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5063, 5068-69
(Vernon). The changes to § 46(a) were minor modifications substituting gender neutral lan-
guage and providing a clearer meaning. Id. § 1, at 5068. The legislature deleted existing sub-
section (b), however, and substituted a new subsection (b) providing that "[s]pouses may agree
in writing that all or part of their community property which is titled or held with indicia of
title becomes the property of the surviving spouse on the death of a spouse." Id. § 2, at 5068-
69. The legislature conditioned the effective date of the changes to Probate Code § 46 on the
passage of the constitutional amendment permitting spouses to provide survivorship rights in
community property. This amendment passed in the general election of November 3, 1987.
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (1948, amended 1980, 1987). See supra notes 113-17 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of cases involving this issue during the Survey period. The legis-
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Because of the public concern about the availability of donor organs, the
legislature amended the Texas Anatomical Gifts Act.278 The amendment
defines more clearly what is a qualified organ or tissue procurement organi-
zation.279 In addition, the amendment places responsibility on hospitals to
identify suitable donors and to solicit, in a tactful manner, donation of body
organs and tissues from the family of a decedent who had not previously
signed an organ donation card.280
Heirship. Since the amendment to Probate Code section 42(b) 281 became
effective September 1, 1987, persons claiming to be illegitimate children may
inherit from their purported fathers if the probate court finds that the pur-
ported father is the father of the child. 282 The legislature also added chapter
26 to the Property Code.2 83 This chapter concerns the property rights in a
decedent's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness.284  Section
26.005 provides for the succession of the property rights following the indi-
vidual's death. 28
5
Estate Administration. The legislature amended Probate Code section
149B(a) to provide that an interested person may petition the probate court
for an accounting and distribution at any time after two years, rather than
the former three years, from the date the court granted the independent ad-
ministration.28 6 An amendment to section 149(b) provides both that the
court shall order the independent executor to distribute the estate, or any
lature also adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act in the Act of June 18, 1987, ch.
678, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Ser. 5063, 5063-68 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 5.41-.56 (Vernon Supp. 1988)). The adoption of the Uniform Premarital Agreement
Act supersedes the former provisions concerning premarital and partition agreements.
278. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-2 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1988).
279. Act of Apr. 22, 1987, ch. 28, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 125, 125 (Vernon) (codi-
fied at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-2(2)0) (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
280. Id. § 2, at 125-27 (codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-2(8A) (Vernon
Supp. 1988)). This Act became effective on January 1, 1988.
281. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
282. Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 464, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4085, 4086 (Vernon).
The legislature added a provision to existing § 42(b) that provides:
A person claiming to be an illegitimate child, or claiming inheritance through an
illegitimate child, may petition the probate court for a determination of right of
inheritance. If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the pur-
ported father was the father of the child, the child is legitimate for the purpose
of inheritance and he and his issue may inherit from his paternal kindred, both
descendants, ascendants, and collaterals in all degrees, and they may inherit
from him and his issue. This section does not permit inheritance by a purported
father of an illegitimate child, whether recognized or not, if the purported fa-
ther's parental rights have been terminated.
Id. at 4086. This addition to § 42(b) reflects the equal protection concerns about paternal
inheritance by illegitimate children. See supra notes 118-34 for a discussion of cases decided in
this Survey period under the language of section 42(b) prior to this change.
283. Act of May 21, 1987, ch. 153, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2551, 2551-57 (Vernon)
(codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 26.001-.015 (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
284. Id. at 2551.
285. Id. at 2552-53. The succession of the property right is similar to the rules of intestate
succession found in TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 38 (Vernon 1980).
286. Act of June 19, 1987, ch. 760, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5432, 5432 (Vernon).
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portion of the estate that the court finds is no longer subject to administra-
tion, and that the court shall order partition and distribution or, if the prop-
erty cannot be fairly partitioned and distributed, sale of the property. 287 The
legislature amended Probate Code section 37A to add a definition of "benefi-
ciary" and to substitute "beneficiary" for wordier language throughout the
section; this amendment also adds the ability of a guardian ad litem to dis-
claim the interests of unborn or unascertained persons. 288 The legislature
added new sections to the Probate Code dealing with apportionment of taxes
in the absence of testamentary direction for apportionment, 28 9 priority of
liability of property for the decedent's debts other than estate tax, 290 and
satisfaction of pecuniary bequests. 29' The legislature added two provisions
allowing for the recovery of costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to
parties contesting the admission of a will to probate 292 and to parties who
seek removal of an independent executor appointment without bond.293
Temporary administrations of decedents' estates are more clearly defined
and separated from temporary guardianships after the seventieth legislature.
The legislature removed mention of a temporary administration of a dece-
dent's estate from Probate Code section 131(a)2 9 4 and added new section
131A 295 to provide for the appointment of temporary administrators. An
amendment to existing section 132(a) 296 provides that the court's power to
appoint a temporary administrator during a contest over admitting a will to
probate or issuing letters of administration is in addition to the power to
appoint a new administrator under new section 131A. 297 The legislature
also included temporary administrators in the class of people permitted to
accept a commission-based compensation for their services in administering
an estate. 2
98
287. Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 565, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4484, 4484 (Vernon).
Rather than ordering the court to make distribution of all or part of the estate or to partition
or sell assets of the estate, the former language was permissive.
288. Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 467, § 2, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4092, 4093-96 (Vernon).
The legislature amended Probate Code section 34A to allow a probate court to appoint a
guardian ad litem for unborn or unascertained persons in any probate proceedings. Id. § 1, at
4092.
289. Act of June 20, 1987, ch. 742, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5323, 5323-27 (Vernon)
(codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322A (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
290. Id. § 2, at 5328 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322B (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
291. Act of June 19, 1987, ch. 1110, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 7664, 7664-65 (Vernon)
(codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 378A (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
292. Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 462, § 3, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4081, 4081 (Vernon)
amended Probate Code § 243 by adding that any beneficiary of a will or alleged will of an
administrator with the will or the alleged will annexed who in good faith and with just cause
defends or prosecutes the admission of the will or alleged will to probate may recover costs
from the estate.
293. Act of June 20, 1987, ch. 719, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5191, 5191 (Vernon)
(codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149C(d) (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
294. Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 461, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4074, 4074 (Vernon).
295. Id. § 2, at 4076-78 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 131A (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
296. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 132(a) (Vernon 1980).
297. Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 460, § 3, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4074, 4078 (Vernon).
298. Act of June 20, 1987, ch. 919, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6240, 6240 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 241(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988). The legislature further re-
vised § 241(a) to provide that a court may disallow all or part of a commission if the court
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The legislature attempted to clarify responsibilities between the district
court and the county court at law in counties without statutory probate
courts.299 Amendments to the Government Code impact Harris County
statutory probate courts.3° An amendment to Probate Code section 8(c)(2)
clarifies ambiguous language pertaining to transfer of an estate to the proper
court in another county. 30 1 The legislature amended statutes relating to no-
tice to certain creditors30 2 and service of process on estates of nonresident
decedents.30 3 All applications for probate and applications for issuance of
letters of administration now must contain the social security numbers of the
applicant and the decedent. 3° 4
Guardianships. An application for the appointment of a permanent guardian
must now include the social security numbers of both the applicant and the
person for whom a guardianship is sought.30 5 An application for the ap-
pointment of a temporary guardian must also include the social security
number of the applicant and the respondent. 30 6 A temporary guardian may
also receive compensation in the form of a commission if the court finds that
the temporary guardian has properly managed the estate.30 7 A parent may
now sell his or her child's real or personal property up to a value of $15,000
finds that the executor or administrator has not prudently managed the estate or if the execu-
tor or administrator has been removed under the provisions of the Probate Code. Act of June
20, 1987, ch. 919, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 6241.
299. Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 459, § 4, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4071, 4073-74 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988). The amendment provides that
the district court will hear contested matters while the county court will continue to exercise
jurisdiction over the ongoing administration of the estate. After the district court decides the
contested issue or issues, the district court will transfer the matter back to the county court for
further consistent proceedings. Id. at 4073.
300. Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 465, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4090, 4090-91 (Vernon)
amended TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.1034 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
301. Act of June 19, 1987, ch. 786, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5548, 5548 (Vernon).
302. Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 461, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4079, 4079 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 295(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988). This Act also amended
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 320(a) to provide that funeral expenses and expenses of the dece-
dent's last illness up to $5000 shall receive the first priority of payment from the estate. Act of
June 17, 1987, ch. 461, § 2, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4079, 4079-80 (Vernon).
303. Act of May 25, 1987, ch. 158, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2572, 2572-73 (Vernon)
amended TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.044 (Vernon Supp. 1988) to add new
subsections (c) and (d); Act of May 25, 1987, ch. 158, § 2, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2572,
2573 (Vernon) amended TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.045 (Vernon Supp. 1988)
to add new subsection (e).
304. Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 463, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4082, 4083 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 81(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988); Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 463,
§ 2, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 4084 amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 82 (Vernon Supp.
1988).
305. Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 463, § 3, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4082, 4084 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § I1 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
306. Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 460, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4074, 4075 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 131(b) to provide that the application for a temporary
guardian must identify the danger to the person or property that necessitates the appointment
of the temporary guardian as well as to require social security numbers of the applicant and
the respondent.
307. Act of June 20, 1987, ch. 919, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6240, 6241 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 241(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
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without seeking appointment as guardian of the child, which is $5000 more
than previously allowed.308 The legislature also amended Probate Code sec-
tion 329(a)(6) to provide that a guardian may borrow money if the probate
court finds that borrowing would serve the best interests of the ward; the
probate court may authorize a guardian to borrow money for the purchase
of a residence for the ward. 309 Probate Code section 34A now provides that
a probate court may appoint a guardian ad litem for unborn or unascer-
tained persons. 31o The amount a debtor of a minor, a person legally ad-
judged to be incompetent, or a former ward of a guardianship terminated
under Probate Code section 404(c) can pay to the county clerk of the county
of the residence of the creditor minor, incompetent, or former ward, or to
the county clerk of a county in which a nonresident creditor, incompetent,
or former ward owns real property, has increased from $15,000 to
$30,000.311
Trusts. The disclaimer provisions relating to trusts now allow "the personal
representative of an incompetent, deceased, unborn, or unascertained, or mi-
nor beneficiary, with court approval" to disclaim the beneficiary's inter-
est.312 The legislature made minor modifications to Property Code sections
concerning conveyances of trust property by trustees and liability of trust
property.313 The legislature also amended various sections of the Property
Code to include references to individual retirement accounts, pension plans,
and other employee death benefits. 314
308. Act of June 19, 1987, ch. 759, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5431, 5431 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 339A(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
309. Act of June 20, 1987, ch. 766, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5483, 5484 (Vernon).
310. Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 467, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4092, 4092 (Vernon).
311. Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 465, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4087, 4087-90 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 144(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
312. Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 467, § 3, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4092, 4096-98 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.010 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
313. Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 684, § 3, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5078, 5080-81 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 101.001 (Vernon Supp. 1988) to change the heading, to
remove the designation of subsection (a), and to change former subsection (b) to new section
101.002 and TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 114.082 to remove the designation of subsection (a)
and to change former subsection (b) to new section 114.0821.
314. Act of June 20, 1987, ch. 741, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5319, 5319-20 (Vernon)
amended TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.004 (Vernon Supp. 1988) to add definitions relating to
employee benefit plans and individual retirement accounts; Act of June 20, 1987, ch. 471, § 2,
1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 5320 amended TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.004(12) (Vernon
Supp. 1988); Act of June 20, 1987, ch. 471, § 3, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 5320-21 amended
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 121.051(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988); Act of June 20, 1987, ch. 471, § 4,
1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 5321-22 amended TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 121.052(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1988); Act of June 20, 1987, ch. 471, § 5, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 5322 amended
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 121.054 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
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